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MONTERREY CONSENSUS ON FINANCING 
FOR DEVELOPMENT: RESPONSE SOUGHT 
FROM INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
INAAMUL HAQUE* & RuxANDRA BuRDEscu** 
Abstract: The Monterrey Conference held in Mexico in March 2002 was 
an exceptionally significant event, qualitatively different from any other 
U.N. conference. It was characterized by the inclusion of all the stake-
holders; preparations were marked by constructive interaction between 
developed and developing countries; and it was free from polemics and 
usual acrimony between rich and poor nations. The Consensus Document 
is profoundly different from other landmark U.N. documents. Developing 
countries have become more realistic, responsible, and mature, while devel-
oped countries-having witnessed the tragic events of September 11 and 
becoming cognizant of the indivisibility of development and security-
exhibited a new spirit of accommodation. Faithful implementation and 
sustaining of the Monterrey spirit is now critically important. In the con-
text of this Article, the Monterrey Conference represents demand, and a 
supply response is expected from international economic law. Much good 
is expected from the synergy between the Conference and international 
economic law. 
Recognizing that peace and development are mutually reinforcing, we are 
determined to pursue our shared vision for a better future, through our in-
dividual efforts combined with vigorous multilateral action.1 
-The Monterrey Consensus Document 
* Inaamul Haque, Former Executive Director, World Bank; Adjunct Professor, Wash-
ington College of Law, American University, Washington, D.C. The author is thankful to 
the American University International Law Review for drawing upon his paper on the Doha 
Development Agenda. This Article contains personal views of the authors, and these views 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank or of the governments Mr. Haque 
represented at the Board of the Bank. 
** Dr. Ruxandra Burdescu, PS Specialist, World Bank; Teaching Assistant, "N. Tit-
ulescu" Law School, University of Craiova, Romania. 
1 REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT, MoN-
TERREY MEXIco, 18-22 MAR. 2002, para. 9, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.l98/ll, U.N. Sales No. 
02.ll.A.7 (2002), available at http:/ /www.un.org/ esa/ffd/aconfl98-ll.doc [hereinafter 
MONTERREY CoNSENSUS]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The International Conference on Financing for Development 
held in Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002 is a significant event that 
has been described as "signal[ing] a turning point in the approach to 
development cooperation by the international community. "2 The 
purpose of convening this Conference was to address 
national, international and systemic issues related to 
financing for development in a holistic manner in the con-
text of globalization and interdependence, and, by so doing, 
will also address development through the perspective of 
finance ... [and] the mobilization of financial resources for 
the full implementation of the outcome of major confer-
ences and summits organized by the United Nations during 
the 1990s and the implementation of the Agenda for Devel-
opment, in particular with regard to poverty eradication.3 
A. Significance of the Monterrey Consensus 
1. Focus on Measurable Improvements 
The Monterrey Conference focused on certain concrete and 
specific dimensions of development instead of dealing with the con-
cept in an abstract and general fashion. 4 The intention was "to 
2 Outcome of International Conference on Financing for Development, Report of the Secretary 
General, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 344, Agenda Item 95, para. 1, at 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/57 /344 (2002) [hereinafter International Conference]. 
3 High-Level Intergovernmental Consideration of Financing for Development, G.A. Res. 9694, 
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, 87th plen. mtg., para. 3, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/ 
54/196 (1999). Since this Resolution predates the Millennium Summit, there is no men-
tion of the Millennium Development Goals in it. 
4 There are a number of definitions for the term "development" and various, often 
competing, development theories. Some scholars have accorded great importance to the 
precise meaning of the term. For example, Denis Goulet points out: "It matters little how 
much information we possess about development if we have not grasped its inner mean-
ing." STEPHEN C. SMITH & MICHAEL P. TODARO, EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 110 (8th ed. 
2002) (citing DENIS GOULET, THE CRUEL CHOICE: A NEW CoNCEPT IN THE THEORY OF 
DEVELOPMENT (1971) ). The scholarly quest for the meaning of the term continues. How-
ever, the variety of definitions can prove to be problematic when a concrete strategy needs 
to be evolved to achieve the goal of development. Hence, the Monterrey Conference very 
wisely concentrated on certain measurable and concrete goals. Paul Streeten, the Former 
Director of the World Development Institute, presents a similar conceptual approach, 
stating that "[d]evelopment must be redefined as an attack on the chief evils of the world 
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achieve measurable improvements in sustainable growth and poverty 
reduction. "5 For realizing the overarching goal of poverty reduction 
and associated welfare goals, such as universal literacy and reduction 
of infant mortality, mobilization of domestic and foreign resources 
was chosen as a matter of high priority and importance for all coun-
tries-developing and developed.6 
2. The Monterrey Consensus: A New Global Partnership 
The Conference evolved a truly global consensus, known as the 
"Monterrey Consensus," which unveiled the blueprint of a new part-
nership that focused on a shared responsibility between developed 
and developing countries. It sought to build an alliance for develop-
ment for all "premised on full ownership by developing countries of 
their development and a renewed commitment on the part of the in-
ternational community to support the development efforts of devel-
oping countries."7 The Monterrey Consensus does not constitute an 
end point but marks the beginning of an important process. 
Evidently, developing countries have a vital stake in a successful, 
forward movement of the process and meaningful implementation of 
the Monterrey Consensus (which explicitly includes the Doha Ac-
cord), with sustained and lasting outcomes for the poor of the world. 
today: malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, slums, unemployment and inequality." ld. (quoting 
Paul P. Streeten). 
5 Development Committee Communique, International Monetary Fund, para. 2 (Sept. 28. 
2002), available at http:/ /www.imf.org/external/np/cm/2002/092802a.htm [hereinafter 
Development Committee Communiquel. 
6 In the 1990s, many international conferences identified a number of goals for the in-
ternational community. The process culminated in the adoption of the "United Nations 
Millennium Declaration," at the turn of the twentieth century, in September 2000, which 
contained clear commitments to make the right to development a reality for everyone. 
The summit agreed on a set of international development goals, known as the Millennium 
Declaration Development Goals (MDGs), to be achieved by 2015. The eight MDGs in-
cluded: ( 1) resolving to cut in half the proportion of people living in extreme poverty (i.e., 
with income ofless than US$1 a day and those who suffer from hunger); (2) guaranteeing 
primary education to all children; (3) promoting gender equality and empowering 
women; (4) cutting child mortality by two-thirds (5) improving maternal health; (6) com-
batting HIV I AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensuring environmental sustainability; 
and (8) developing a global partnership for development. United Nations Millennium Decla-
ration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 8th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 60(b), paras. 
19-21, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (2002), available at http:/ /www.un.org/millennium/dec-
laration/ares552e.htm [hereinafter Millennium Declaration]; see also World Bank Group, 
About the Goals, at http:/ /www.developmentgoals.org/ About_the_goals.htm (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2004). 
7 International Conference, supra note 2, para. 5, at 2. 
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It is thus critically important to ensure dynamic, participatory, and 
sustained implementation and follow-up; without this, the Monterrey 
Consensus will only add to the already bloating number of elegant, 
eloquent, and solemn declarations adopted at high-level Conferences 
and routinely consigned to the limbo of oblivion. 
3. Implementation of the Consensus 
The Consensus Document, cognizant of the critical importance 
of faithful implementation, has declared: "To build a global alliance 
for development will require an unremitting effort. We thus commit 
ourselves to keeping fully engaged, nationally, regionally and interna-
tionally, to ensuring proper follow-up to the implementation of 
agreements and commitments reached at the present Conference 
•••• "8 The Monterrey Consensus specifically called for a follow-up 
international conference to review its implementation and mandated 
that modalities of that conference be decided upon no later than 
2005.9 The Development Committee,10 in its meeting on September 
28, 2002, has also highlighted the importance of follow-up action in 
these words: 
The global community must now convert the ideas and the 
shared approaches agreed in Doha, Monterrey and Johan-
nesburg into concrete action and measure ongoing progress. 
Experience has repeatedly shown that progress will only be 
made through implementation of sound and sustainable 
country-driven strategies. To make existing and new aid 
commitments more effective, these strategies must also be 
supported by better coordination and cooperation amongst 
development partners and by effective alignment of donor 
support with country strategies.ll 
8 MoNTERREY CONSENSUS, supra note 1, para. 68, at 15. 
9 Development Committee Communique, supra note 5, para. 3. 
10 The Development Committee, established in 1974, can be regarded as an authentic voice 
of both developed and developing countries. It was set up "to advise the Boards of Governors of 
the [World] Bank and the [International Monetary] Fund on critical development issues and 
on the financial resources required to promote economic development in developing coun-
tries." World Bank Group, Development Committee, at http:/ /web.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DEVCOMMEXT/O,,menuPK:60001650-pagePK:60000303-piPK:640 
00842-theSitePK:2774 73,00.hunl (last visited Feb. 19, 2004). 
11 Development Committee Communique, supra note 5, para. 3. 
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B. Relevance of International Law 
1. Consolidating Legal Foundations of the World Community 
This Article endeavors to articulate the nature and dimensions of 
the response sought by developing countries, in the context of Monter-
rey Consensus, from international economic law. One may legitimately 
ask whether implementation of the Consensus "should not fall within 
the exclusive province of the economists, diplomats, and statesmen. "12 
A lawyer's craft, it is contended, can never supply the wanting social 
and political basis for an effective legal system,l3 These arguments are 
apparently convincing; but given the enormous challenge of poverty 
reduction, such a diffident concept needs to be given up. The positive, 
pro-active role of international law in the contemporary world would 
be to "exploit empirically the opportunities afforded by political, social, 
economic and technological developments and changes, and deep-
rooted moral forces, which do afford the basis for an effective interna-
tional legal system, in such a manner as to consolidate the legal struc-
ture and foundations of the world community"14 in the post-Monterrey 
world. International law-or, more appropriately, international eco-
nomic law-faces an enormous challenge today and developing coun-
tries expect a befitting response from it. 
2. Development as a Theme in International Law 
International law and development are no strangers to each 
other. In fact, with the possible exception of international peace and 
security, global economic development has been the dominant theme 
in international law and international relations since the end of 
World War II, with variable tone and strength but focusing on the 
same international arrangements and programs.15 Even the distinc-
tion between these two categories is becoming academic because, to-
day, both international peace and security and global economic de-
velopment constitute a seamless web. World Bank President, James 
Wolfensohn, addressing the Monterey Conference, aptly highlighted 
12 PERCY E. CORBETT, LAW IN DIPLOMACY 273 (1959). 
13 Id. 
14 C. WILFRED jENKS, LAW, FREEDOM AND WELFARE 64 (1963). 
15 See EvAN LUARD, THE UNITED NATIONS: How IT WoRKS AND WHAT IT DoEs 8 (2d 
ed. 1994). 
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this reality: "Here at Monterrey we must recognize the link between 
progress in development and progress in peace."16 
3. Needs and Concerns of Developing Countries 
Against the backdrop of deliberations in Monterrey, one may 
profitably identify principal needs and major expectations of develop-
ing countries in this era of globalization. These countries want strong 
international institutions, a favorable external environment, and effec-
tive instruments with firm legal foundations. These elements will pro-
vide poor nations with the necessary protection and enabling means to 
ensure that the economic integration will reduce poverty and close 
gaps within and between nations. Developing countries are particularly 
concerned with issues of attracting private capital flows, gaining unre-
stricted access to markets, receiving adequate development assistance, 
benefiting from technology transfers, improving global economic gov-
ernance, and enhancing the coherence and consistency of the interna-
tional systems in support of development.t' In short, they need a sup-
portive world economic environment. Developing countries seek these 
changes because they are expected to help alleviate abysmal poverty, 
which, at present, is the fate of many of their inhabitants. 
16 James D. Wolfensohn, Remarks to the Plenary Meeting at the Conference on Financing 
for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, World Bank News Release No. 2002/ 251/S (Mar. 21, 
2002), at http:/ /web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/O,contentMDK:20043623 
-menuPK:34463-pagePK:64003015-piPK:64003012-theSitePK:4607,00.html [hereinafter Wolf-
ensohn, Remarks]. 
17 "Developing countries are hungry for foreign direct investment (FDI) and are re-
forming their markets to attract it," as revealed by a survey conducted by the European 
Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), with help from the International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC). International Chamber of Commerce, Market Reform Attracts Foreign In-
vestment in Developing Countries, Survey Reveals, at http:/ /www.iccwbo.org/home/ 
news_archives/2000/ert_survey.asp (July 10, 2000). The report, stemming from two years 
research, showed continuous improvement in the investment conditions of thirty-three 
developing countries. Id. The survey included countries in Latin America, Asia, and Mrica. 
Id. "Citing examples set by countries formerly closed such as Syria, Iran and Vietnam, the 
survey found many countries have pressed ahead with reforms to attract FDI despite events 
such as the Asian financial crisis and the failure of multilateral talks on investment at the 
OECD [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development]." Id. The survey 
pointed to several benefits resulting from FDI: knowledge disseminates more quickly be-
tween global markets; consumers have improved choices as a result of more support for 
competition; and emphasis on best business practices and good corporate governance lead 
to increased environmental awareness. Id. 
2004] Response Sought from International Economic Law 
4. Expectations of Developing Countries from International 
Economic Law 
225 
From the perspective of developing countries, international eco-
nomic law has a key role in addressing the critical issues set out above. 
Specifically, developing countries expect it to: 
(a) Help gain and consolidate better access to markets and expand 
international trade through multilateral agreements, based on 
the rule of law; 
(b) Play an important role in transforming Official Development As-
sistance (ODA) from an unpredictable, charitable gesture from 
individual nations into a predictable, voluntary, and binding obli-
gation of the world community; 
(c) Contribute to developing a supportive and fair legal environment 
(to investors as well as source and host countries) to encourage a 
greater flow of private foreign direct investment (FDI) to a larger 
number of developing countries; 
(d) Assist in creating a better system to resolve external debt prob-
lems and developing an international debt workout mechanism 
for restructuring unsustainable debt in a timely, efficient, and fair 
manner; and 
(e) Lead to improvements in global economic governance.ts 
I. THE CoNTEXT oF CHALLENGES PosED To DEvELOPING CouNTRIEs 
Before further elaborating on the expectations of developing 
countries, it would be helpful to delineate the contextual contours 
within which challenges are posed to developing countries and the 
responses that are sought by them from international economic law. 
In this section, we will address the following two themes: (a) poverty 
in the contemporary world, and (b) globalization. 
IS See e.g., Terre des homes, The Appeal to Governments from European NGOs on 
Our Minimum Expectations for the Outcome of the Monterrey Financing for Develop-
ment Conference, at http:/ /www2.weed-online.org/ffd/EU_NGOs_on_Monterrey.htm 
(last visited Apr. 27, 2004). 
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A. Poverty in the Contemporary World 
1. Co-Existence of Deprivation and Plenty 
Poverty in the midst of affluence is a colossal tragedy of our 
times. In today's world, enormous hunger and unprecedented plenty 
co-exist. Out of the six billion people who presently inhabit this 
planet, 2.8 billion live on less than US$2.00 a day and 1.2 billion live 
on less than US$1.00 a day. 19 A fifth of the developing world's popula-
tion goes to bed hungry every night, 1.5 billion people do not have 
access to even a basic necessity such as safe drinking water, 2 billion 
lack safe sanitation, and 73 out of every 1000 children born do not 
see their first birthday. 2o 
Eighty percent of global GDP of about US$30 trillion accrues to 
20% of the world's population, and the remaining 80% of the world's 
citizens have only a 20% share in the total GDP.21 "The average in-
come in the richest 20 countries is 37 times the average in the poorest 
20-a gap that has doubled in the past 40 years. "22 
Poverty involves multiple deprivations and is indeed a denial of 
the most basic human rights: the right to freedom from hunger and 
malnutrition, the right to healthcare and education, the right to make 
ones own choices, and the right to development. Undeniably, the per-
sistence of abysmal poverty offends the notion of human decency and, 
at the same time, poses a real threat to the world's security. It has 
been rightly described as a malady "like a cancer-weakening the 
whole of the body, not just the parts that are directly affected. "23 
In the last five decades, developing countries have, no doubt, 
made noticeable economic progress. The pace of their development 
has been much faster than that of industrialized countries a century 
ago. Improvements have occurred on various fronts, including rising 
19 WoRLD BANK GRouP, WoRLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000/2001, ATTACKING Pov-
ERTY: OPPORTUNITY, EMPOWERMENT, AND SECURITY 3 (2001), available at http:/ /www.world-
bank.org/ poverty /wdrpoverty /report/ overview. pdf [hereinafter ATTACKING PovERTY]. 
20 See World Bank Group, Water Supply and Sanitation, at http:/ /www.worldbank. 
org/watsan/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2004). 
21 See James D. Wolfensohn, The Challenges of Globalization: The Role of the World 
Bank, Speech Before the Public Discussion Forum (Apr. 2, 2001), at http:/ /web.world-
bank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/O,,contentMDK:20025027-menuPK:34472-pageP 
K:34370-piPK:34424-theSitePK:4607,00.html. 
22 ATTACKING PovERTY, supra note 19, at 3. 
23 James D. Wolfensohn, Partnership for Development and Peace, Address at the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center (Mar. 6, 2002), in WoRLD BANK, A CASE FOR Am: 
BUILDING A CONSENSUS FOR DEVELOPMENT AssiSTANCE 5 (2002). 
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life expectancy, failing infant mortality, increasing literacy, and im-
proved nutrition.24 Industrial countries have also continued to make 
phenomenal progress in recent times. As a consequence, given their 
increased will and wisdom, they now have ample means to eradicate 
the existing colossal misery from the disadvantaged parts of the world. 
Despite this capacity to change the world for the better, one is 
still confronted with a somber situation: life expectancy in poor coun-
tries is just fifty-nine years, while in rich countries it is almost eighty 
years.25 Mortality among children under five years in low income 
countries is around 115 and in rich countries it is just seven.26 While 
more than 120 million children in the developing world lack access to 
primary education, the industrial countries have universal enrollment 
in their schools.27 The starkness of these contrasts attests to the con-
tinuing toll of human deprivation. 
2. Consensus on Assault on Poverty 
A definite consensus exists today, most recently reiterated in the 
Monterrey Conference,28 on the need for mounting a truly serious 
assault on global poverty. The alleviation of poverty is not only a de-
mand of basic ethical principles but is dictated by the elementary self-
interest of affluent nations. It has now become self-evident that, in the 
long run, an orderly world is unlikely if great affluence exists in one 
part of the world and abject poverty exists in another. Citizens and 
governments of the industrialized countries are quickly realizing that 
they can no longer afford the luxury of insulation. 
The planet Earth has indeed acquired the vulnerability of a 
spaceship. H there was a doubt as to the reality of this vulnerability, it 
stands dispelled by the tragic events of September 11th. A clear sense 
of obligation to eradicate poverty is felt not only by NGOs and other 
members of civil society in industrialized countries but also by 
influential and enlightened political, leaders such as Chancellor 
Gordon Brown of the United Kingdom, who recently declared: "We 
24 ld. at 6-7. 
25 World Bank Group, Data on Poverty, Social Indicators, Health: Life Expectancy, at 
http:/ /www.worldbank.org/poverty/data/trends/mort.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2004). 
26WoRLD BANK GROUP, THE LmLE DATA BooK 16-22 (4th ed. 2002). 
27 World Bank Group, Data on Poverty, Social Indicators, Education: Primary Enroll-
ments, at http:/ /www.worldbank,org/poverty/data/trends/educ.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 
2004). 
28 Wolfensohn, Remarks, supra note 16 ("And for perhaps the first time in an interna-
tional meeting there is greater consensus than ever before about what needs to be done."). 
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have in our hands the power and obligation, never given to any other 
generation at any other time in human history, to banish ignorance 
and poverty from the earth. "29 
B. Globalization 
Globalization is the defining attribute of our times. Societies and 
economies are becoming increasingly integrated. Centripetal impulses 
have received strong impetus from, inter alia, "reduced costs of trans-
port, lower trade barriers, faster communication of ideas, rising capital 
flows, and intensifying pressure for migration."30 The resulting integra-
tion is a highly complex process, affecting almost all aspects of our eve-
ryday lives. A highly interdependent world is no longer an elegant 
phrase but has become a reality. The option today for developing coun-
tries is not whether they should embrace globalization; rather, it is how 
to manage the process, respond to challenges posed by this mighty 
force, and derive optimum benefit from the immense opportunities 
offered by it. While doing so, it would be appropriate to acknowledge 
that globalization is an irreversible process, at least in regard to its key 
dimensions, such as information, ideas, and communications.31 It 
would be pertinent to bear in mind that globalization is manifested in a 
variety of ways both positive and negative: 
The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11 
were one aspect of globalization. Rapid growth and poverty 
reduction in China, India, and other countries that were poor 
20 years ago is another. The development of the internet and 
easier communication and transportation around the world is 
29 Chancellor Gordon Brown, Speech Given at the Commonwealth Parliamentary As-
sociation's Conference (Mar. 12, 2002), at http:/ /www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and 
_speeches/ press/2002/ press_19 _02.cfm. 
30 WORLD BANK GROUP, GLOBALIZATION, GROWTII, AND POVERTY: BUILDING AN IN-
CLUSIVE WoRLD EcoNOMY 1 (2002), available at http:/ /econ.worldbank.org/prr/global-
ization/text-2857 I [hereinafter GLOBALIZATION, GROWTII, AND PovERTY]. 
31 Even though globalization is most commonly defined through increased cross-
border trade and FDI, it is far more than economics. It may also involve discourse on hu-
man rights or the territorial notion of state sovereignty. Of course, the gains from trade 
(between nations and firms) increase global welfare by having products made where they 
can be produced cheaply and by allocating them to the people who want them more. See 
generally Mark A.A. Warner, Globalization and Human Rights: An Economic Mode~ 25 BROOK. J. 
INT'L L. 99 (1999). Indeed, states and other legal actors-for example, international or-
ganizations-facilitate the process of globalization by legitimizing or legalizing its effects 
upon the international community. In conclusion, globalization has a broad significance 
and transforms the economies of specific parts of the world, as well as politics, culture, and 
religion. It encompasses multifaceted, multi-layered, and often disjunctive processes. 
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a third. The spread of AIDS is part of globalization, as is the 
accelerated development of life-extending technologies.32 
1. Complexity of Globalization 
229 
As globalization is a highly complex phenomenon, not surprisingly 
it is simultaneously praised and berated. Nevertheless, most of its fea-
tures are warmly welcomed almost universally. Globalization has proven 
to be a beneficial and positive force in many ways. It has led to "faster 
growth, higher living standard[s], [and] new opportunities."33 It has 
substantially opened international trade, enabling many developing 
countries to grow faster.34 It has also given unprecedented access to 
32 GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 30, at ix. 
33 Secretary General Kofi A. Anan, Message to the Baur International Model United 
Nations (Apr. 6, 2001), at http:/ /www.carolbaur.edu.mx/bimun2003/presentation.htm. 
34 See The World Bank Group, Questions and Answers with David Dollar, at http:/ I 
www.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization/dollarqa.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2004) 
(noting that "the more globalized" developing countries that, in the 1980s and 1990s, sought 
FDI and opened up their markets experienced increases in their per capita growth rates) 
[hereinafter Questions and Answers with David Dollar]. 
The World Bank strongly argued that the round of trade talks launched in November 
2001 in Doha, Qatar, IItarked the first time that developing country interests were placed at 
the center of a multilateral round of trade negotiations. The World Bank favors lifting the 
protectionist measures that have locked low-income countries out of rich-country export 
IItarkets. A World Bank Report outlines the benefits that would flow to developing countries 
and the world's poor from a liberalization of trade. It estimates that substantially lowering 
agricultural IItanufacturing tariffs and ending agricultural subsidies could cut the number of 
people living in poverty by eight percent by 2015. THE WoRLD BANK, GLOBAL EcoNOMIC 
PROSPECTS 2004: REALIZING THE DEVELOPMENT PROMISE OF THE DOHA AGENDA, at xxix 
(2003), available at http:/ /www.worldbank.org/prospects/gep2004/full.pdf. 
There is a growing consensus in empirical studies that greater openness to interna-
tional trade has a positive effect on country per capita income. A study by Jeffrey Frankel 
and David Romer estimates that increasing the ratio of trade to GDP by one percentage 
point raises per capita income by between one-half and two percent. See jeffrey A. Frankel 
& David Romer, Does Trade Cause Growth?, 89 AM. EcoN. REv. 379, 379-99 (1999), available 
at http:/ /home.hio.no/ -ivar-br /fag/intecon/Tradeandgrowth. pdf. 
Numbers of other studies reach similar conclusions, though the estimated size and sta-
tistical significance of the effects vary. See, e.g., Sebastian Edwards, Openness, Productivity and 
Growth: What Do We Really Knowr, 108 EcoN. J. 383-98 (1998). For a more skeptical assess-
ment, see generally DANI RoDRIK, THE NEW GLOBAL EcoNOMY AND DEVELOPING CouN-
TRIES: MAKING OPENNESS WoRK (1998). 
Moreover, the idea that greater openness to international trade has a positive effect on 
country per capita income is not new but dates back to economic theories from at least 
200 ago. World Bank Group, Does More International Trade Openness Increase World 
Poverty?, at http:/ /wwwl.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization/ag02.html (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2004). The most widely-known and oldest of such theories holds "that 
trade lets an economy make better use of its resources by allowing imports of goods and 
services at a lower cost than they could be produced at home." !d. 
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knowledge and information to many citizens of developing countries, 
which were ''well beyond the reach of even the wealthiest in any coun-
try a century ago. "35 Notwithstanding all these advantages, one comes 
across anti-globalization protests often. Today, no international eco-
nomic summit can be imagined without a sideshow of anti-globalization 
activists.36 One encounters this strong backlash because the benefits of 
globalization are not being equally distributed and the global market is 
not underpinned by rules based on shared and equitable objectives. 
Prosperity, despite the increasing integration of national economies, 
continues to elude many, and the actual number of extreme poor in 
the world-excluding China-increased by almost 100 million between 
1987 and 1998.37 This occurred, as Stiglitz pertinently pointed out, at 
the same time when global world income actually increased by 2.5% 
annually. In short, for "many in the developing world, globalization has 
not brought the promised economic benefits. "38 
Developing countries accuse the industrial countries of adopting 
double standards in matters of international trade. They contend that 
while developed countries are pressuring developing countries to liber-
alize trade, they have not effectively dismantled their own barriers to 
imports of labor-intensive industrial goods and agricultural produce 
from poor countries. On the contrary, in violation of principles of free 
trade, rich countries continue to subsidize their farmers by paying up 
to one billion dollars a day in subsidies.39 Objectively seen, industrial 
35 joSEPH £. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 4 (2002). The anti-
globalization protests themselves are the result of this interconnectedness. Links between 
activities in different parts of the world, particularly those links through Internet commu-
nication, have greatly strengthened these activities. 
36 Such protests occurred, for example, at the WTO meeting in Seattle (1999), World 
Bank and IMF Spring Meetings in Washington (April 2000), Annual Meetings in Prague 
(2000), and Annual Meetings in Washington (September 2002). 
37 World Bank Group, Data on Poverty, Income Poverty, The Latest Global Numbers, at 
http:/ /www.worldbank.org/poverty/data/trends/income.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2004) 
(reporting that, although the percentage of the world's population living on less than $1 per 
day decreased during the 1987-1998 period, the number of actual extreme poor has in-
creased with population growth). 
38 See STIGLITZ, supra note 35, at 5. 
39 As one study notes: 
Ours is a world out of balance. Of the six billion people living in the world 
today, one billion receive 80 percent of global income, while more than one 
billion barely survive on less than a dollar a day. And, while developed coun-
tries spend $600 billion a year on defense, and incur $300 billion in direct 
and indirect agricultural subsidies, they offer only $56 billion a year in aid to 
developing countries. Over the next 25 years, 50 million people will be added 
to the population of rich countries. But over the same period, about one and 
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countries indeed drive the process of globalization. The developed 
world has managed to ensure that it "garners a disproportionate share 
of the benefits, at the expense of the developing world. "40 
2. Globalization and Poverty Reduction 
Against this backdrop of conflicting forces and perspectives, the 
most critical questions posed by developing countries are (1) whether 
globalization helps in poverty reduction, and (2) if so, then how can 
we enhance the effectiveness of the process? Research recently con-
ducted by the World Bank has yielded three relevant findings con-
cerning trends of the last twenty years:41 
(a) Poor countries with populations of around three billion have 
been able to break into global manufacturing and services mar-
kets. This has resulted in decreased poverty, for example, in re-
gions of China and India and in Bangladesh and Vietnam. 
(b) With decreased income and increased poverty, countries with 
populations of around two billion that have lowered their partici-
pation in international trade risk becoming marginalized in the 
global economy. 
(c) According to surveys, countries worry that "cultural or institu-
tional homogenization" will be sacrificed with increased economic 
integration. 
As to apprehensions about threats to cultural diversity, the study 
notes that societies that are fully integrated into the global economy 
differ enormously.42 Nonetheless, the report admits that some recent 
a half billion people will be added to the population of poor countries. Today, 
more than 2.9 billion people-nearly half the world's population-are under 
the age of 25. Many of these young people will experience poverty and un-
employment. Disillusioned with what they will see as an inadequate global sys-
tem, many will leave their homes, and often their countries, to find work. 
World Bank Group, The Challenge: Reducing Poverty, at http:/ /www.worldbank.org/ 
progress/reducing_poverty.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2004); see also Thalif Deen Rich Na-
tions Fail Aid Pledge to Poor, DAWN/THE INTERPRESS NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 7, 2003, available 
at http:/ /www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews= 20996. 
40 STIGLITZ, supm note 35, at 7. 
41 See generally SHAHID YUSUF, GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE FOR DEVELOPING 
CouNTRIES (2001), available at http:/ /wwwl.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globaliz-
ation/documents/wps2168.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2004); Questions and Answers with 
David Dollar, supra note 34; Nicholas Stern, Foreword to GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND 
PovERTY, supra note 30, at x. 
42 Stern, supra note 41, at x. 
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developments within global trading and investment are forcing coun-
tries towards an undesired standardization.43 It concludes: "It is im-
portant that global trade and investment agreements respect coun-
tries' freedoms in a range of areas from intellectual property rights, 
cultural goods, and environmental protection to social policies and 
labor standards. "44 
Overall, it can be claimed that globalization is a positive force for 
development and poverty reduction, though there are specific meas-
ures that countries should earnestly take to make it more effective 
and poor-friendly. To realize the great potential from globalization, 
countries need complementary institutions and policies, which can be 
strengthened through involvement in international markets. (This 
raises issues of sequencing, such as which kinds of openings can be 
undertaken if one wants to minimize the risks associated with global-
ization.) Lastly, there are concrete measures that both developing and 
developed countries can undertake to ensure that poor people par-
ticipate in globalization and benefit from it.45 
4. Relevance of Globalization to the Response Expected from 
International Law 
Owing to the importance of the subject of globalization, no study 
or report on any contemporary theme, regardless of its nature or 
purpose, can afford to ignore the reality and endemic character of 
this momentous phenomenon. Whether it is within the economy, 
politics, or culture, globalization touches all areas of life, even if it is 
often used in confusing, overlapping, or even contradictory ways.46 
Globalization indeed creates parameters for action and determines 
the context within which both developed and developing countries 
must function in the world at this juncture in time. Recognizing the 
reality and force of globalization is clearly germane to the response 
expected and desired by the developing world from international 
economic law, particularly with respect to issues of trade barriers, pri-
vate capital flows, volume and quality of ODA, debt relief, and sys-
temic issues of global economy. 
48 ld. 
44 ld. at x-xi. 
45 See id. at xi. 
46 See Kenneth Anderson, Public International Organizations, NGOs, and Democratic 
Sovereignty in the Era of Globalization: An Essay on Contested Legitimacy (Sept. 27, 2000) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (citing MALCOLM WATERS, GLOBALIZATION 
7-8 (1995)). 
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II. INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC LAw: CoNCEPT, ScoPE, AND PoTENTIAL 
A. Classical Law of Nations 
The classical law of nations has been a product of the European 
Christian civilization (arguably up to the founding of the United Na-
tions). The creators of international law were a few European powers 
that came to dominate the rest of the world. Not surprisingly, interna-
tional law did not accept many people under colonial domination as 
the "subjects" of the system, but merely treated them as objects of the 
law.47 Further, despite a palpable increase in the significance of eco-
nomic activities in the wake of industrial revolution, international law 
remained preoccupied with laws of peace and war, diplomacy, sover-
eignty, immunities, and similar themes. 
B. Change of Paradigm: Two Important Events 
The concept and scope of international law has been changing 
since the latter half of the twentieth century. Two catalytic events oc-
curred, putting into motion a variety of developments and initiating a 
multitude of processes. The first event was the establishment of the 
United Nations, which virtually coincided with the dawn of decoloni-
zation. The second event was the emergence of global economic in-
terdependence coupled with a quest for development on the part of 
the newly independent states and a willingness on the part of some 
formerly affluent colonial powers to support such aspirations. 
1. Birth of the United Nations 
The United Nations was born in 1945 with fifty-one Member 
States, but only thirteen of them were situated in Asia or Mrica.48 
Since then, 140 new nations have joined, raising its current member-
ship to 191.49 The universality of the United Nations' composition is 
47 See Inaamul Haque, From Charity to Obligation: A Third World Perspective on Concessional 
Resource Transfers, 14 TEx. INT'L LJ. 389, 394 (1979). Many leading scholars of the nine-
teenth century subscribed to the view that international law applied only between "the 
civili[z]ed and Christian people of Europe or to those of European origin." R.P. Anand, 
Attitude of the Asian-African States Toward Certain Problems of International Law, 15 INT'L & 
CoMP. L.Q. 55, 59 (1966) (quoting HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
17-18 (8th ed. 1866)). 
48 See United Nations, Growth in UN Membership, 1945-2003, at http:/ /www.un.org/ 
Overview/growth.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2004). 
49 With the exception of Switzerland, the new entrants are developing or transitional 
economies. 
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indeed unique in history. International society has become for the 
first time a true world society. International law, which constitutes the 
foundation of any international order, has moved away from its initial 
occidental exclusiveness and has come to embrace all "peace-loving 
states which accept the obligations contained in the [U.N.] Charter 
and ... are able and willing to carry out these obligations. "50 
2. Impact of Globalization 
The second event (which is still unfolding and very much in the 
works) is manifested in two waves5I of globalization affecting integra-
tion of economies into a seamless web. International law, in order to 
remain relevant in a world where economic issues among countries 
dominate life, has responded by evolving into a separate branch, 
which can truly be called "international economic law" (IEL). 
C. Definition of International Economic Law 
1. Two Approaches 
There can really be no dispute about the existence of IEL in its 
own right. However, there are different opinions as to what the nature 
and precise definition of the subject are, whether a precise and con-
crete identification of the topic can be made, or whether it is "merely 
a loose designation for a variety of sub-topics of international law 
which have some connection with economic affairs. "52 
Two approaches have been adopted with respect to the definition 
of1EL.53 One approach opts for a narrow connotation while the other 
approach defines it widely (sometimes too widely). For example, rele-
50 U.N. CHARTER art. 4, para. 1. 
51 On the second wave of globalization, see Questions and Answers with David Dollar, 
supra note 34. 
52 PETER VERLOREN VAN ThEMAAT, ThE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
EcoNoMIC LAw 21 (1981). One of the difficulties of defining the concept of IEL springs 
from the fact that many scholars do not use the expression as such, but instead prefer to 
talk about parts of the subject rather than about the subject as a whole. There are numer-
ous scholars and writers who address the subjects of trade law, investment, monetary law, 
developing states, and economic sanctions, but they do not refer to the phrase "interna-
tional economic law." Historically, it can be claimed that there are authors who pointed to 
the origins of IEL as early as the twelfth century. Id. at 22. Recendy, of course, there has 
been an explosion of articles, journals, books, and theories addressing various facets of 
IEL. See, e.g., id. 
55 See id. 
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vant to the latter category, a French jurist gives the following 
definition: 
cette branche du droit international qui reglemente, d'une part 
!'installation sur le territoire des Etats des divers facteurs de produc-
tion (personnes et capitaux) en provenance de l'etmnger et, d'autre 
part, lcs transactions internationales portant sur les biens, les se1V-
ices, et les capitaux.54 
According to this definition, IEL embraces the following sub-topics: 
law of establishment, law of investment, law of economic relations and 
economic institutions, and law of regional economic integration.55 Yet 
there are others who would include additional topics, such as the in-
ternational law of development or law of human rights. 56 
In its widest connotation, IEL refers to those rules of public in-
ternational law that directly concern economic exchanges between 
the subjects of internationallaw;57 thus, this broadest definition covers 
an important part of the discipline of public international law. If one 
were to extend its ambit by including all those aspects of international 
law affected by economic activities, then the discipline of public in-
ternational law would be completely engulfed by IEL.5S Generally, the 
role expected from IEL is what determines preference for which par-
ticular definition of IEL to use. 
2. Expansive View as to the Scope of International Economic Law 
One can appropriately define IEL as a branch of international 
law that consists of the rules, customs, principles, and processes appli-
cable to all international economic relations. The modern approach 
favors this expansive view of IEL, to which the authors also subscribe. 
The conceptual foundation of this definition is reflective of current 
54 Id. at 21 (citing D. CARREAU ET AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIQUE 11 (2d ed. 
1980)). The authors provide the following translation: "That branch of international law, 
which regulates, on one hand, the establishment, on the territory of a State, of different 
means of production (persons and capital) from abroad, and, on the other hand, the in-
ternational transactions of goods, services and capital." 
55 VAN THEMAAT, supra note 52, at 20-22. 
56 Id. 
57 See id. at 26. 
58 One author considers that ninety percent of international law work relates to IEL. 
John H. Jackson, Global Economics and International Economic Law, 1 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 1, 8 
(1998). There are others who maintain that IEL is or should be a discipline on its own, 
separate from public international law. See id. at 8-9; CoLLOQUE n'ORLEANS, AsPECTS DU 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIQUE 29-31 (1952). 
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academic thinking and political trends. It acknowledges that global-
ization of the world economy is resulting in increasing transactions 
between various economic forces and policies that involve structure, 
macroeconomics, trade, finance, and development.59 It equally rec-
ognizes that to extend the scope of international law to all economic 
phenomena would be too broad, inexact, and unwieldy. Therefore, it 
would be appropriate to approach the subject with the assumption 
that there is a general outline, which has a core and a penumbra. In 
essence, the terrain comprises the economic phenomena, which are 
or should be of international concern, while the economic phenom-
ena are demarcated by the international system ofvalues.60 
3. International Economic Law and International Development Law 
Another related concept is that of international development law, 
which emerged immediately after World War II. It represented an at-
tempt to find a more equitable legal approach to the core issues of IEL, 
namely international trade relations and state responsibilities towards 
foreign investors and their home countries. 51 
International economic relations of developing countries, includ-
ing issues relating to their development, clearly fall within the prov-
ince of IEL. In view of this, international development law, regarded 
by many scholars as a distinct branch of international law, is itself a 
subset of IEL. In this Article, the authors choose to treat IEL as the 
pivot because it is more comprehensive and has a wider scope. Doing 
so also addresses the problem arising out of yet another distinction 
sometimes made between development law and international law of 
development. 52 IEL subsumes all these categories. 
sg Id. 
60 ld. at 14. 
61 Id. at 2. Under the pressure of the problems that arose in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
general understanding of concept of development became strained. See Daniel D. Bradlow, 
Development Decision-Making and the Content of International Development Law, 27 B.C. INT'L & 
CoMP. L. REv. 195, 196-99 (2004). As a consequence "the consensus [on the content of in-
ternational development law] has broken down." See id. at 199. 
62 See RUMU SARKAR, DEVELOPMENT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 4 7 (Rosa M. 
Lastra &JJ. Norton eds., 1999) ("Further, development law should also be distinguished 
from the tradition of the international law of development popularized during the 1970s 
as part of the NIEO Agenda."). 
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D. Dynamic Development of the Scope of International Law 
1. Cooperative Law of Nations 
The purpose and instrumental role of the law is well recognized in 
the domestic setting. Mter all, "ends of the economist become policy 
only through the means provided by the law."63 Likewise, it is only 
through instrumentality of international law that orderly changes in 
the structure and processes of international economic relations can be 
brought about. More importantly, there has been a conceptual shift in 
the role of international law following decolonization. In the post-
colonial world, we must develop rules and institutions to address prob-
lems faced by the enlarged international community.64 Wolfgang 
Friedmann invited attention, as far back as 1970, to emergence of the 
"cooperative law of nations,"65 which binds countries "not in the inter-
national rules of abstention and respect, but in positive principles of 
cooperation for common interests."66 It would be only in the fitness of 
things if this "cooperative law of nations" brings within its fold imple-
mentation issues of the Monterrey Consensus, which are indeed critical 
for international economic cooperation in the world oftoday.67 
2. Alterations in the Sociological Structure of the Community of 
Nations 
Although architects of modern international law no longer enjoy 
numerical majority and dominant position, this fact is yet to be fully 
reflected in the structure and processes of international law. The law 
created by prosperous nations was conceived in terms of liberty for 
sovereign states. New nations have a different order of priorities and 
requirements, and they seek protection against the strong. A commu-
nity in which the majority of the members are poor needs a law that 
expresses the responsibility of the whole for the part. Therefore, the 
alteration in the sociological structure of the community of nations 
63 EUGENE V. RosTOW, PLANNING FOR FREEDOM: THE PUBLIC LAW OF AMERICAN CAPI-
TALISM 362 (1959). 
64 Id. 
65 W. Friedmann, The Relevance of International Law to the Process of Economic and Social 
Development, in 2 THE FuTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 4 (Cyril E. Black & 
Richard A. Falk eds., 1970). 
66 Id. 
67 See SARKAR, supra note 62, at 49 ("Indeed, development law is meant to respond to 
the pressures being exerted by the entire globalization process, and the need to articulate, 
promulgate and implement organizing legal principles around those needs."). 
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should be accompanied by a corresponding change in substantive 
norms of law. International law has, to some extent, accorded recog-
nition to these changing needs by keeping the social and economic 
development of the world community as its legitimate concern. But 
much more indeed needs to be done to achieve full concordance be-
tween sociological realities and normative structures governing the 
relations of nations. 
3. Duty to Cooperate 
In fact, progressive jurists discern the firm foundation of interna-
tional welfare in Article 55 of the United Nations Charter, which states 
that the United Nations shall promote higher standards of living, full 
employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and de-
velopment.68 Article 56 reinforces this by declaring that all members 
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation 
with the organization to achieve the purposes set forth in Article 55.69 
These provisions of the Charter, read with relevant resolutions of the 
General Assembly and declarations at the highest political level from 
international conferences and summits-particularly the agreement 
on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)7°-leave no doubt as to 
the moral and legal validity of treating international development as 
the shared objective of all countries. Even those in developed coun-
tries who dispute the legal entitlement of developing countries to 
preferential treatment cannot deny the existence of a mutual duty to 
cooperate in development efforts. As Ramu Sarkar aptly elaborates: 
"More importantly, the act of cooperating with each other is more 
than joint or simultaneous action, it is the unity of action to a com-
68 U.N. CHARTER art. 55. 
69 Whatever may be differences in the interpretation of these articles, it is relevant to 
remember what judge Azevedo aptly observed: "The Charter is a means and not an end. 
To comply with its aims one must seek the methods of interpretation most likely to serve 
the natural evolution of the needs of mankind. Whatever might have been the intention, 
or more appropriately in this case, the lack of intention at the time of the establishment of 
the United Nations, its Charter now creates obligations for the well-being of 'humanity.'" 
Advisory Opinion on the Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a 
State to the United Nations, 1950 I.CJ. 3, 23 (Mar. 3) (dissenting opinion).judge Alvarez 
stated that "[an institution] must develop, not in accordance with the views of those who 
created it, but in accordance with the requirements of international life." Advisory Opin-
ion on the Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, 1948 I.CJ. 56, 68 
(May28). 
70 See supra note 6 (discussion on MDGs). 
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mon end or common result. The common end result is the develop-
ment of all nations. "71 
Evolution of the obligation to cooperate for development marks 
a significant milestone. The international legal system must now be 
seen as serving the interests of the whole community of nations and 
not just those of its affluent and powerful segment. Thus, the emer-
gence of a customary law norm, which makes it obligatory for the 
affluent countries to assist the poor nations in their development, is a 
logical and wise culmination of the various developments since the 
establishment of the United Nations. 
International law can become a major force for change only if it 
effectively relates to the major issues that currently confront the 
world. It must bear upon the problems of global poverty in order to 
find a viable solution to the unfortunate situation that exists today. 
The future of international law depends upon the allegiance it com-
mands from those subject to it. The allegiance that any legal system 
commands is, in turn, dependent to a great extent upon its content. 
The fight against universal poverty, deprivation, and backward-
ness is now being recognized as a collective international responsibil-
ity. V\lhereas international forums (the latest being the Monterrey 
Consensus) are now occupied with this theme, some jurists in devel-
oped countries continue to remain frozen in time and show undue 
attachment to the outmoded rules of international law, which are still 
disproportionately concerned with old questions of war and peace. 
These attitudes and perspectives need to be changed. Dynamics of life 
make it imperative to evolve new norms and institutions in response 
to changing circumstances. 
E. Historical Logic for Evolving New Foundations 
1. Westphalia Model 
From a historical perspective, one finds a compelling case for 
putting in place a new legal foundation for more sustainable eco-
nomic arrangements among nations in the world. In Europe, a new 
international religious order emerged with the Peace of Augsburg 
71 SARKAR, supra note 62, at 57 n.l7 ("Co-operate: To act jointly or concurrently to-
ward a common end. Co-operation: In patent law, unity of action to a common end or a 
common result, not merely joint or simultaneous action.") (citing BLAcK's LAW DICTION-
ARY 334 (6th ed. 1990)). 
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(1555 A.D.), which formalized the doctrine of cuius regio eius religio.72 
Religious warfare, nevertheless, continued with unabated fury, com-
ing to an end only with the Peace of Westphalia (1648 A.D.), which 
not only consolidated a new international religious order but also in-
augurated a new international legal order.73 
2. Post-Westphalia Model 
The Westphalia model has endured to this day, but it is now nec-
essary to move on to a new stage of development, because phenome-
nal changes have occurred in the world and should be properly 
reflected in the law of nations. The establishment of the United Na-
tions, the triumph of the anti-colonial struggle, breaches in the cita-
del of racism, and the increasing acceptance of the principle of self-
determination all point to the emergence of a new international 
moral order. In fact, the demand for a more just economic dispensa-
tion acquires validity only in the context of such a moral order. As in 
an earlier era, when the emergence of a religious order by itself was 
insufficient, the new moral order and economic dispensation dictated 
by it could not achieve real fulfillment without the evolution of a sup-
portive legal order. Developing countries have been fully aware of this 
need, which was expressly articulated by President Luis Echeverria of 
Mexico in 1972 (while initiating the drafting of the Charter of Eco-
nomic Rights and Duties) when he declared that the purpose of the 
effort would be to "strengthen the precarious legal foundations of 
international economy" and to remove "economic co-operation out of 
the realm of goodwill and put it into the realm of law .... [by] trans-
fer[ring] the concrete principles of solidarity among men to the area 
of relations among countries."74 Echeverria further stated that, with-
out rights and obligations to protect weaker nations, "[a] just order 
and a stable world will not be possible. "75 
72 See Richard A. Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International 
Legal Order, in 1 THE FuTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 32 (Cyril E. Black & 
Richard A. Falk eds., 1969). 
73 Id. 
74 Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Three Hundred and Fifteenth Meeting, 
U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., at 67, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2315 (1974). 
75 Id. 
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III. THE MoNTERREY CoNSENsus 
A. Pre-Eminent Moral and Humanitarian Challenge 
1. Expectations of Developing Countries 
The Monterrey Conference76 gave world leaders a great oppor-
tunity to make real progress in coming up with an appropriate re-
sponse to the "pre-eminent moral and humanitarian challenge of our 
age"77-alleviating poverty. On the eve of the Conference, expecta-
tions of developing countries were aptly summed up by Vicente Fox, 
the President of Mexico and co-host of the event, in these words: 
This week in Monterrey we have the duty to take steps to en-
sure that future generations in the developing world can be 
spared the poverty and suffering that until now have been 
their inevitable destiny. We also have an opportunity to build a 
bridge between what we promise developing countries to do 
and what we can accomplish tomorrow. It is not a matter of 
becoming our brother's keepers, but simply their partners. 78 
The participants in the Conference thus came to Monterrey with an 
explicit objective to establish a framework for development coopera-
tion based on a solid international consensus. 
2. Emerging Framework for Poverty Reduction 
The Consensus reached in the Conference emphasizes at the 
outset that while each country has primary responsibility for its own 
economic and social development, national efforts need to be sup-
ported by an enabling international economic environment. Under 
the emerging framework, both developing and developed countries 
76 The fact that efforts made thus far have not resulted in a significant reduction of 
worldwide poverty clearly indicates the need for a new partnership concept based on a 
framework of mutual obligations between developed and developing countries designed to 
eradicate poverty. Fortunately, there are signs that the international community is moving 
towards such a partnership. In particular, the Monterrey Consensus and the Millennium 
Declaration have provided the blueprint of a partnership based on shared responsibilities 
between rich and poor nations. See MoNTERREY CoNSENsus, supra note 1; Millennium Decla-
ration, supra note 6. 
77 See Letter Dated 25 june 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General As-
sembly, U.N. High-Level Panel on Financing for Development, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda 
Item 101, U.N. Doc. A/55/1000 (2001). 
78 Vicente Fox, Monterrey: A Turning Point, WASH. PosT, Mar. 19, 2002, at A21. 
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are to provide the necessary means to attack poverty. On their part, 
developing countries are required to mobilize resources for sustain-
able pro-poor growth, formulate sound macroeconomic policies, 
promote a good investment climate, design and implement effective 
and coherent poverty reduction strategies, and provide a voice to the 
poor-all with "sound policies, good governance at all levels and the 
rule of law. "79 In return, affluent countries must be willing to provide 
an enabling environment for development, enhance market access 
(including phasing out of agricultural subsidies), support the flow of 
private capital to the developing countries, accelerate effective debt 
relief, and provide a substantial increase and sustainability in devel-
opment assistance. The Monterrey Consensus embodies a bold and 
timely attempt to establish a new system of shared global rules an-
chored on a framework of mutual obligations and accountability be-
tween developed and developing countries.so 
B. Mobilizing Resources for Meeting MDGs 
1. Partnership for Eradication of Poverty 
At Monterrey, leaders of both poor and rich countries of the world 
have entered into a qualitatively different partnership dedicated to 
"eradicate poverty, achieve sustained economic growth and promote 
sustainable development"81 as the world advances to a fully inclusive 
and equitable global economic system. The heads of State and Gov-
ernment participating in the Conference made an unambiguous com-
mitment to "mobilizing and increasing the effective use of financial 
resources and achieving the national and international economic con-
ditions needed to fulfill internationally agreed development goals, in-
cluding those contained in the Millennium Declaration, to eliminate 
poverty, improve social conditions and raise living standards, and pro-
tect our environment."82 These commitments were regarded by the 
participants of the Conference as their first step to ensuring that the 
twenty-first century becomes the century of development for all.83 
79 MONTERREY CONSENSUS, supra note 1, para. 4, at 2. 
so Id. para. 1, at 2. 
81 Id. paras. 1-9, at 2-3. 
82 !d. para. 3, at 2. 
83 !d. 
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2. Combination of National and Multilateral Efforts 
The Monterrey Consensus recognizes that peace and develop-
ment are mutually reinforcing.84 It has expressed the determination 
of leaders of the international community to pursue their shared vi-
sion for a better future through individual efforts combined with vig-
orous multilateral action.85 Upholding the United Nations Charter 
and building upon the values of the Millennium Declaration, they 
committed themselves to promoting national and global economic 
systems based on the principles of justice, equity, democracy, partici-
pation, transparency, accountability, and inclusion.86 
The development agenda agreed upon in Monterrey is based on a 
clear recognition of the mutual responsibilities of rich and poor coun-
tries.s7 James Wolfensohn perceived this to be "an understanding that 
leaders of the developing and developed world are united by a global 
responsibility based on ethics, experience and self-interest. It is a rec-
ognition that opportunity and empowerment-not charity-can 
benefit us all."88 One can see in this historic consensus a potential for 
flowering an international social contract to further common and mu-
tual global interests. Mutuality has been the essence of the process. It 
represents a significant change from the New International Economic 
(NIEO) movement in the 1970s, where developing countries in their 
quest for economic equity were noticeably influenced by their historical 
experience, essentially wishing reparations for past colonial wrongs.89 
C. Themes of the Monterrey Consensus 
The Monterrey Consensus contains six elements: (1) domestic 
resource mobilization, (2) mobilizing international resources (private 
capital flows) for development, (3) trade, (4) international financial 
cooperation for development (official development assistance), ( 5) 
debt, and (6) systemic issues.90 If one were to adopt a more thematic 
approach, the following four themes emerge:9 ' 
84 MoNTERREY CoNSENsus, supra note 1, para. 9, at 3. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. paras. 1-9, at 2-3. 
88 Wolfensohn, Remarks, supra note 16. 
89 See SARKAR, supra note 62, at 73. 
90 MoNTERREY CoNSENsus, supra note 1, ch. II, at 3-15. 
91 Report on the G-24 Workshop on Financing for Development, IntergO\·ernmental Group of 
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development, at 3 (Sept. 6-7, 2001), 
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(a) Bringing about a substantial increase in the volume and effec-
tiveness of foreign resource flows (private, bilateral, and multilat-
eral) in support of development, with a clear focus on poverty 
eradication; 
(b) Setting up a fair, transparent, and ethical procedure and institu-
tional framework for resolving external debt problems; 
(c) Improving global economic governance to make it more partici-
patory and accountable to a broader community of nations; and 
(d) Creating an international trading environment that is more sup-
portive of growth, in general, and the development of the poor, 
in particular. 
IV. MOBILIZING DOMESTIC FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT 
In our common pursuit of growth, poverty eradication and sustainable de-
velopment, a critical challenge is to ensure the necessary internal conditions 
for mobilizing domestic savings, both public and private sustaining ade-
quate levels of productive investments and increasing human capacity.92 
-The Monterrey Consensus Document 
A. Mobilizing Domestic Resources 
The Monterrey Consensus rightly stresses the importance of mo-
bilizing domestic resources. This source of finance has always played a 
key role in the development of any country. National savings and in-
vestment propel economic growth. No amount of external resources 
can really become a substitute for national efforts. A number of "lead-
ing actions,"93 in this regard, have been identified in the Consensus 
Document, including enhancing the efficiency, coherence, and con-
sistency of macroeconomic policies; increasing productivity, reducing 
capital flight, encouraging the capital sector, and attracting and mak-
ing effective use of international investment and assistance; building 
good governance and fighting corruption; and fostering a dynamic 
and well-functioning business sector.94 The Consensus Document also 
regards the presence of a number of mutually reinforcing elements as 
essential for fostering a pro-growth environment. These include free-
available at http:/ /www.g24.org/ICFDRep.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Re-
port on the G-24 Workshop]. 
92 MoNTERREY CoNSENSUS, supra note 1, para. 3, at 2. 
93 Id. ch. II, at 3. 
94 Id. paras. 10-19, at 3-5. 
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dom, peace and security, domestic stability, respect for human rights, 
rule of law, gender equity, market-oriented policies, and commitment 
to just and democratic societies.95 
B. Supportive Actions by the International Community 
The leading actions mentioned above are critically important but 
essentially fall within the domestic purview of individual countries. Of 
course, in the interdependent world of today, an enabling domestic 
environment requires supportive action from the international com-
munity. Even so, IEL hardly has a direct role to play in this regard. 
Therefore, we turn to the next element in the Consensus. 
V. MoBILIZING INTERNATIONAL REsouRcEs FOR DEVELOPMENT: 
FoREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) AND OTHER PRIVATE FLOWS 
Private international capital flows, particularly foreign direct investment 
along with international financial stability are vital complements to na-
tional and international development efforts.96 
-The Monterrey Consensus Document 
A. Importance of P1ivate Capital Flows for Development 
Private capital flows have assumed great importance for develop-
ing countries during the last fifteen years. Developing countries see 
securing and sustaining private cash flows as imperative if they expect 
"to emerge from the poverty trap and to catch up with the richer 
countries[,] for there is never likely to be enough concessional 
finance to support investment needed for accelerated growth.''97 De-
veloping countries often experience chronic shortage of resources. 
Both national saving rates and export revenues are low.98 Foreign 
inflows under these conditions are indeed critical for growth to re-
duce the heavy burden of external debt, augment domestic savings, 
95 ld. 
96 Id. para. 20, at 5. 
97 Report on the G-24 Workshop, supra note 91, at 6. 
98 See WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (2002); see also Interna-
tional Finance Corporation, Annual Report 1995: The Climate for Private Investment, at 
http:/ /www2.ifc.org/PUBLICAT/ ANNREP /1995/CLIMATE.HTM (last visited Apr. 29, 
2004). 
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and increase the rate of investment.99 Many developing countries have 
relied in the past upon ODA for filling in their financing gaps. How-
ever, this source of resources has been shrinking for many years.100 
One can gauge the quantum of reduction in ODA's share in 
flows by the fact that, if humanitarian assistance is not taken into ac-
count, annual official flows to developing countries have hovered 
around US$15 billion per year, compared to private flows of US$150 
billion, the average during the 1995-2000 period according to one 
estimate.101 There have been, of course, fluctuations in private flows 
between a peak ofUS$235 billion in 1996 to a trough of only US$109 
billion in 2000.102 The share of developing countries in global FDI 
flows reached 38% in 1997 but came down to 24% in 1999. However, 
it is pertinent to note that, despite these fluctuations, the amount of 
FDI has increased almost threefold from US$58 billion in 1993 to 
US$163 billion in 2001. These figures show the evident importance of 
private capital flows for the developing world. 
Private capital flows, however, have been bypassing the majority 
of the developing countries, particularly the least developed coun-
tries. These flows are selectively destined to a limited number of coun-
tries such as Brazil, China, India, and Malaysia, which all have good 
credit ratings. The degree of concentration can be judged by the fact 
that just ten countries received eighty percent oftotal FDI flows to the 
developing world.l03 
B. The Need for Efforts lYy Developing Countries 
1. Improving the Investment Climate 
Given the increasing importance of private capital flows for de-
velopment, the Monterrey Consensus calls for the creation of neces-
sary domestic and international conditions to facilitate momentum 
and wider geographical coverage.l04 It emphasizes the importance of 
99 ShahidJ. Burki, Foreign Direct Investment: Has Pakistan Missed the Boat or Could 
It Play Catch Up (Dec. 2001) (paper presented at the Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies). 
100 See GLOBALIZATION, GRowTH, AND PovERTY, supra note 30, at 10. 
101 See Report on the G-24 Workshop, supra note 91, at 6-7. There are, however, different 
sets of figures, but the fact remains that private flows exceed ODA flows by a very wide 
margin. ld. 
1o2 See Burki, supra note 99, at 2. 
1o3 Jd. 
104 See MONTERREY CONSENSUS, supra note 1, para. 20, at 5. 
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continuing efforts on the part of developing countries for achieving a 
transparent, stable, and predictable investment climate with proper 
contract enforcement, respect for property rights, and sound macro-
economic policies and institutions.105 To complement national efforts, 
the Monterrey Consensus pleads for increasing support from interna-
tional and regional organizations and appropriate institutions in 
source countries for enhancing the volume of FDI, particularly in in-
frastructure development and other priority areas)06 It highlights, 
inter alia, the importance for developed countries to provide export 
credits, co-financing, venture capital, and other lending instruments, 
risk guarantees, and aid resources,I07 
3. Change in Attitudes of Developing Countries 
Developing countries have come a long way in their attitudes to-
wards private flows. They recognize that the world is moving towards 
an increasingly liberal international investment regime, where states 
permit the market to determine allocations of capital, ensure the 
proper functioning of the market, and provide legal protection for 
investment against wrongful injury by private or public agents,lOB The 
so-called "phenomenal shift toward[s] liberalization"I09 was largely 
driven by a perception that private investment would promote eco-
nomic development. Few, if any, developing states have embraced lib-
eralization as an end in itself; they are adherents to the liberal faith 
only to the extent that practicing it leads to economic salvation. no 
105 Id. para. 21, at 5. 
106 I d. para. 22, at 6. 
107 See id. 
108 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime, 
19 MICH.j. INT'L L. 373, 399 (1998). 
109 According to NEIL F. GREGORY ET AL., FoREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: EXECUTIVE 
SuMMARY 2 (lnt'l Fin. Corp., Lessons of Experience Series No.5, 1997): 
I d. 
Recent trends toward globalization of production and consumption patterns 
have led to a sharp increase in global FDI. At the same time, trade and in-
vestment liberalization has brought more developing countries into the glob-
alized economy. This has led to a dramatic surge in FDI flows to developing 
countries, which increased fivefold from 1990 to 1995, and exceeded $100 bil-
lion in 1996. This increase went mainly to 12 large developing countries, in 
part reflecting their economic size. Thus, China alone received $167 billion 
between 1990 and 1996 (1996 prices). Already a significant part of the econ-
omy in many developing countries, FDI is likely to continue at high levels for 
the foreseeable future. 
uo Vandevelde, supra note 108, at 390. 
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Reservations and suspicion of the past have been replaced by a 
keen desire to attract foreign investment. Developing countries have 
been converted to the idea of such investments playing a crucial role 
in development of their countries. As a consequence, "[a] growing 
number of countries are putting in place the twin pillars of pro-poor 
growth: the climate for investment, entrepreneurship, and jobs; and 
the empowerment of and investment in poor people to participate in 
the process of development."lll 
The proposition that developing countries must build and sustain 
a supportive and favorable environment for foreign investment is ap-
parently axiomatic. However, if seen in correct perspective, it must be 
admitted that many of the things that developing countries are ex-
pected to do are a result of development. The process takes a long 
time. In the interim period, there is a real danger (already material-
ized) that most of the countries might compete for foreign invest-
ment by "offering incentives, which would simply divert investment 
from one location to another. "112 One can already see evidence of a 
"race to the bottom" whereby excessively generous incentives result in 
substantial reductions in net benefits of FDI to the host country. Fur-
ther, both investors and officials of host countries sometimes resort to 
corrupt practices, which also detracts from the advantages ofFDI. 
B. Salient Features of the Current Investment Regime 
Investment is a complex subject. Its scope encompasses a variety 
of different categories,113 such as FDI,114 portfolio investment,115 and 
even licensing agreements for technology transfers. 116 Notwithstand-
ing the evident importance of the subject and positive achievements 
11 1 Nicholas Stern, Making the Case for Aid, in WoRLD BANK GROUP, A CAsE FOR Am: 
BUILDING CONSENSUS FOR DEVELOPMENT AsSISTANCE 21 (2002) [hereinafter Stern, Mak-
ing the Case]. 
112 Report on the G-24 Workshop, supra note 91, at 7. 
113 Stephen Zamora, Economic Relations and Development, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 251 (Christopher Joyner ed., 1997) ("Under the rubric of the Bret-
ton Woods system, specialized agencies affiliated with the United Nations have adopted 
regimes covering the major categories of international economic relations. An important 
gap exists in the Bretton Woods system, though: no multilateral treaty either UN spon-
sored or otherwise, sets forth a regime for foreign investment.") (footnote omitted). 
114 FDI controls interests in productive enterprises. 
115 Further complicating the matter of investment is that certain portfolio investments, 
such as purchases of stock or securities and bank deposits, do not carry majority control of 
an enterprise. 
116 Again, adding to the complexity of investment is that such agreements may involve 
control over the production of goods and services produced by the licensee. 
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in other major categories of international economic relations, so far 
there has been no multilateral investment treaty creating a regime for 
foreign investment.117 Many attempts have been made, but none has 
succeeded. This has been primarily attributed to a lack of interna-
tional consensus in the matter, as rich and poor countries have widely 
divergent views. liB 
1. Regulation by Laws of Host Nations 
In the absence of a multilateral treaty, foreign investments are 
primarily regulated by domestic laws of host nations. Under custom-
ary international law, principles of sovereignty support a state's clear 
right to regulate commercial activities within its borders.ll9 This 
117 See Zamora, supra note 113, at 251. 
us There are many such subjects for which there are no internationally agreed rules 
due to the divergence in interests and perspectives between developed and developing 
countries, including expropriation of foreign-owned property, guarantees of and limita-
tions on repatriation of investments, remedies for breaches of investment agreements, 
operations of multinational corporations, liability of parent companies for the acts of the 
subsidiaries, and licensing of technology. 
From 1995 to 1998, a Multilateral Agreement on Investment ('MAl') was un-
der negotiation within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment ('OECD'), a group of thirty of the world's largest and most devel-
oped countries .... [M]any ... developing states raised vocal objections to 
the negotiations. Human rights and other non-governmental organizations 
('NGOs') mounted a massive coordinated attack on the MAl. Over the course 
of 1998, the negotiations were suspended, and finally terminated, in the face 
of these objections but primarily because of critical differences between nego-
tiating partners. 
Glen Kelley, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced Approach to Multinational Corporations, 
39 COLUM.j. TRANSNAT'L L. 483, 484 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
ll9 International law can be created from international agreements, customary prac-
tice, or general principles of common legal systems. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FoREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 102 (1987). Stephen D. Krasner, in SOVEREIGN'IY: 
ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3-4 ( 1999), has most eloquently pre sen ted the development of the 
concept of sovereignty: 
The term sovereignty has been used in four different ways-international le-
gal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interde-
pendence sovereignty. International legal sovereignty refers to the practices 
associated with mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that 
have formal juridical independence. Westphalian sovereignty refers to politi-
cal organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority 
structures within a given territory. Domestic sovereignty refers to the formal 
organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public 
authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity. 
Finally, interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of public authorities 
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power is extensive and encompasses such issues as capacity to engage 
in business, forms of business enterprises, conditions of continuance 
of a business, and regulations of capital markets as well as those of 
foreign capital inflows and outflows. A country also has the right to 
terminate or expropriate any business.12o 
The exclusive sway of domestic law is, however, mitigated to an 
extent in practice due to commitments made by a country under the 
investment-related regime of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and the bilateral investment treaties entered into by the host and 
source countries. 
3. Trade-Related Investment Measures 
The Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations led, inter alia, to 
the adoption of the "Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Meas-
ures."l21 These rules, commonly known as TRIMs, implement a na-
tional treatment principle and seek to eliminate measures that are con-
sidered inconsistent with GATT /WTO obligations. An annex to the 
Agreement lists such measures, including performance requirements 
laying down minimum domestic content, limitations on imports or 
mandatory exports, and restrictions on access to foreign exchange that 
limit imports for use in foreign investment based facilities.l22 
4. Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Currently, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) dominate the in-
ternational investment scene. By the end of 1999, more than 1850 
BITs had been signed.l23 By the end of 2001, "almost 200 countries 
[had] signed at least one BIT, and a total of approximately 2099 BITs 
to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capi-
tal across the borders of their state. 
ld.; see also Rett R. Ludwikowski, Supreme Law or Basic Law? The Decline of the Concept 
of Constitutional Supremacy, 9 CARDOZOj. INT'L & COMP. L. 253,263 (2001). 
120 RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AI.., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: IN A NUTSHELL 
543 (1st ed. 1995). 
121 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at http:/ /www.wto.org/ 
english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf. 
122 RALPH H. FoLSOM ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: IN A NuT-
SHELL, 783 (2d ed. 2001). 
123 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2000: CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUI-
smoNS AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (2000), available at http:/ /www.unctad.org/en/docs/wirOO 
ove.en.pdf (the number increased from 181 at the end of 1980 to 1856 at the end of 1999). 
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[were] in place worldwide."124 During 1991-1999, this coincided with 
more than 1000 changes effected in laws, rules, and regulations in 
various countries to increase the attractiveness of developing coun-
tries to foreign investors}25 
Frequently referred to as treaties for the "Promotion and Protec-
tion "126 of investment, BITs seek to facilitate and safeguard FDI. They 
spell out rights and obligations of both the host country and the for-
eign investor.l27 A BIT provides comfort to investors and strong moti-
vation for a host country to honor its obligations under international 
law and its agreements with investors}28 Violation of any obligations 
guaranteed to the investor by the treaty129 means not only a breach of 
124 Jessica S. Wilste, An Investor-State Dispute Mechanism in the Free Tmde Area of the Ameri-
cas: Lessons from NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 51 BuFF. L. REv. 1145, 1153 (2003). Wilste further 
states that "this represents a significant increase from the approximately 1300 BITs in place 
worldwide by the end of 1998." /d. at 1153 n.39 (citing Joel C. Beauvais, Note, Regulatory 
Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging Principles & Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 
245, 252-53 (2002)). Continuing to detail such statistics, Wilste includes that "even just 
between 2000 and 2001, the number of total BITs in effect worldwide increased by 158 
from 1941." /d. (citing UNCTAD, Developing Countries Further Liberalize Their FDI Re-
gime in 2001, at http:/ /rO.unctad.org/en/subsites/dite/bit_dtt.htm); see also Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 
124 (2003). 
125 Wilste, supra note 124, at 1153-56. 
126 See F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT'L L. 241, 244 (1981). 
127 See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 
17, 1992, Austl.-Indon., 1770 U.N.T.S. 301 (1994) (Austl.-Indon. BIT); Agreement for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Apr. 27, 1976, U.K.-N.Ir.-Indon., 1074 U.N.T.S. 
195 (1978) (U.K.-Indon. BIT). For a comprehensive discussion on BIT contained rights, 
indirect expropriation, and breaches of fair and equitable treatment claims involving an 
allegation of improper interference with a foreign investment by the host States, see gen-
erally Stuart G. Gross, Inordinate Chill: Bm, Non-NAFTA M/Ts, and Host-State Regulatory Free-
dom: An Indonesian Case Study, 24 MicH.]. INT'L L. 893 (2003). 
12s Jack J. Coe, Jr., International Commercial Arbitration: Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 
in Its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. ThANS-
NAT'L L. 1381, 1414 (2003) ("Like their European counterparts, U.S. BITs in increasing 
numbers contemplate that a tribunal composed exclusively or partially of foreign lawyers 
(typically holding no judicial rank in their home countries) will be empowered, for the 
single dispute in question, to award damages to an investor, subject to little or no judicial 
review, perhaps based on state conduct that was perfectly lawful as a matter of domestic 
law."). 
129 These treaties often contain provisions limiting expropriation to public purposes 
only, in a nondiscriminatory fashion, and only upon the payment of prompt, adequate, 
and effective compensation. See id.; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 516-21 (3d 
ed. 1991). 
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a treaty with the investor's home state,l30 but also a violation of cus-
tomary international law with many consequences that a wise country 
should avoid. 
Apart from the evident need to resolve problems, a dispute be-
tween an investor and host country can easily escalate into one be-
tween the host and home country. Therefore, provisions of BITs re-
lated to the dispute settlement procedures are deemed very impor-
tant even though various alternatives exist. These alternatives include 
resolving disputes by direct negotiations between the parties, applying 
host country administrative and judicial procedures, or using interna-
tional arbitration centers.l31 
3. Stabilization and International Arbitration Clauses 
In many cases, BITs also seek to provide protection against 
changes in the host country's political regime that could result in re-
neging on contractual stipulations as well as reversal of policies to the 
detriment of investors. Since international law considers FDI matters as 
traditionally falling under the jurisdiction and discretion of the host 
country, investors would normally only have recourse to domestic judi-
cial forums. The problem is compounded by the fact that many devel-
oping countries have not yet developed an independent judiciary to 
serve as an effective check on exercise of power by the executive and 
legislature. As a consequence, the investor is left with no standing to 
appeal to an international tribunal and must obey the ruling of the 
domestic courts ofjustice, even if these are patentlyunjust,l32 
Therefore, BITs sometimes require a host country to give assur-
ances against substantial changes in the investment regime that would 
be detrimental to foreign investors. This may include providing dis-
pute settlement in a neutral forum and/or a promise that no domes-
tic legislation will be passed to alter existing agreements to the detri-
130 Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Reducing Political Risk in Developing Coun-
t1ies: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance, 
15 N.Y.L. Scu.J. INT'L & CaMP. L. 1, 6 (1994). 
lSI Thomas L. Brewer, International Investment Dispute Settlement Procedures: The Evolving 
Regime for Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAw & PoL'v INT'L Bus. 633, 654. (1995). 
m Recent trends in international law indicate that these principles would not apply 
when there is a human rights violation against the investor. See RosALYN HIGGINs, PRoB-
LEMS AND PRocEss: INTERNATIONAL LAw AND How WE UsE IT 94 (1994); Rosalyn Higgins, 
The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law, in 176 REcuEIL DES 
COURS 259-355 (1982). 
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ment of the investors.133 International arbitration and stabilization 
clauses preventing a host country from unilaterally changing its poli-
cies, or subjecting it to a neutral jurisdiction for dispute resolution, 
thus provide much needed protection to investors.l34 However, host 
countries may be unreasonably burdened. This is particularly true in 
cases where policies were formulated by a previous regime for corrupt 
motives. Likewise, costs of an international dispute resolution mecha-
nism may be too great for a poor country to afford. 
4. Political Risk Insurance 
Independent of BIT framework, FDI in developing countries is 
facilitated by a system of political risk insurance, which provides cov-
erage against various eventualities, including confiscation, nationali-
zation, expropriation, and repossession of equipment (forms of asset 
coverage), or loss from contract repudiation, currency inconvertibil-
ity, and contract cancellation due to political violence (forms of con-
tract coverage).135 Investors can obtain such insurance from nationally 
133 The assurance should include a solemn undertaking by host countries that they will 
not abuse the process of law in order to prevent the specified forum from exercising juris-
diction. See generally DOMENICO DI PIETRO & MARTIN PLATTE, ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATION AwARDs: THE NEw YoRK CoNVENTION oF 1958 (2001). 
134 See Comeaux & Kinsella, supra note 130, at 15-32. To prevent the host country from 
unilaterally changing the terms of a concession agreement or similar grant, the interna-
tional arbitration clause would assure that any dispute arising in relation to the concession 
is settled before an international tribunal. This would provide investors with a neutral fo-
rum where they may best protect their rights and secure compliance of host countries' 
obligations in the matter. At the same time, a stabilization clause is equally important since 
it prevents the state from imposing new laws on investors that would change the terms of 
the agreement and detrimentally affect the rights conferred by the agreement. A stabiliza-
tion clause affirms the fact tha~ the law in force in the state at a given date (usually, when 
the agreement takes effect) is the law that will apply to supplement the terms of the con-
tract, regardless of future legislation, decrees, or regulations issued by the government. 
Therefore, the state alienates its right to unilaterally change the regime and rights as set 
forth in the agreement. See id. When an investor considers investing in a developing coun-
try that has a controversia.l track record on protecting private property, and the state's 
domestic laws are less likely to give the investor protection under international law, inves-
tors may successfully protect their interests by inserting the above-described clauses in any 
negotia.ting contracts with the host country. However, this is not the only solution that 
investors have in order to reduce the risk faced when investing in developing countries. 
Ultimately, the investors may procure investment insurance, but there are costs attached to 
this course of action. See id. at 33. 
135 The following provides an example of how the World Bank's Multilateral Invest-
ment Guarantee Agency has provided a developing country with political risk insurance: 
In its first project in Cote d'lvoire, MIGA issued two guarantees totaling more 
than $16 million to Touton SA of France for its equity investment and share-
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sponsored insurance agencies, such as United States' Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC), private insurers, or the World Bank's 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).lll6 
C. Evolving System of FDI and Proposals for the Futurel37 
1. Desired Changes in the Existing System 
Developing countries, including the new "globalizers," expect that 
the FDI system will positively evolve with reforms at bilateral, regional, 
and globallevels.l3S They would like, among other things, distinctions 
to be made in respect of dispute settlement procedures between inter-
government and inter-firm or firm-government disputes. 139 They also 
expect other improvements-such as convenient location of interna-
tional arbitration centers, reduction in arbitration costs (or a system of 
subsidizing such costs), and capacity building-to enable them to fend 
for themselves in sophisticated dispute resolution forums located in 
foreign countries. 
holder loan to Touton Cote d'Ivoire. The project involve[d] the acquisition 
and rehabilitation of three cocoa plantations and the construction of a fac-
tory to clean and bag cocoa beans. Once the rehabilitation is complete, the 
plantations are expected to produce more cocoa per hectare than the na-
tional average, partly due to the use of high quality seedlings and plant shel-
tering techniques. In addition, each plantation would be equipped with mod-
ern fermentation, drying, and packaging units. MIGA insurance covers the 
investments against the risks of expropriation and war and civil disturbance. 
WORLD BANK GROUP, MULTILATERAL INVFSTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY, POLITICAL RisK 
INsuRANCE 1-2 (2000), available at http:/ /www.miga.org/screens/pubs/factsheet/Sector. pdf 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2004). 
1!16 See id. at 32-48. In a rapidly growing investment insurance market, private insurers 
(for example, Lloyd's of London, American International Group, Citicorp International 
Trade Indemnity, Chubb Group, Pool d'Assurance des Risques Internationaux et Speciaux 
of Paris, etc.) started competing with government-subsidized insurance programs. Private 
insurance is, in some cases, more flexible (easily customized and can be kept in strict 
confidence), but government-sponsored insurance or MIGA has other advantages. For 
example, it is less expensive, has better facilities for covering currency inconvertibility 
risks, and can be issued for terms of up to twenty years. See id. 
U7 See generally Michael A. Geist, Toward a General Agreement on the Regulation of Foreign 
Direct Investment, 26 LAw & PoL'v INT'L Bus. 673 (1995). 
138 See World Trade Organization, Canc\m WTO Ministerial: Briefing Notes, Dispute 
Settlement: Force of Argument, Not Argument of Force, at http:/ /www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/brief_e/briefl3_e.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2004). 
139 See id. 
2004] Response Sought from International Economic Law 255 
2. Preferred Multilateral Investment Regime 
In the current seller's market for investment, there is a strong 
likelihood of increasingly unequal and asymmetrical arrangements. 
The present investment regime that relies solely upon the network of 
BITs and focuses on securing an agreement on a set of legal rules for 
the protection of foreign investment-without giving any thought to 
the legitimate interests and priorities of host countries-is inadequate 
for changing needs and does virtually nothing to address market fail-
ures. Further, many BITs do not even have transparency provisions. 
Developing countries would therefore like to see the evolution of 
a multilateral investment regime that is comprehensive, balanced, and 
fair. They expect IEL to inform the resulting Convention and Multi-
lateral Treaty, which should not be driven by wishes and priorities of 
OECD countries, but should give proper weight to the perspectives of 
host countries. This regime should also include core principles re-
garding the conduct of transnational corporations and technology 
transfers. A multilateral regime will have to take care of the interests 
of investors and ensure sustainability of a liberal investment environ-
ment.140 
In light of the partnership concluded at Monterrey and the new 
shared vision of the world, it should be possible to structure a multi-
lateral agreement on investment and universalize the legal framework 
for a liberal investment regime in the same way that the GATT /WTO 
has universalized liberal trade policy. Such a multilateral agreement 
could be accompanied by a set of codes addressing a range of prob-
lems, such as environmental protection, restrictive business practices, 
and tax policies.l4l 
14° While advocating the establishment of legal norms for transnational corporations 
(TNCs), developing countries have, in the past, been averse to similar norms for host 
countries. This has been an unfair and unrealistic approach. The new effort for a viable 
and widely acceptable regime should be built on lessons learned from past failures, both 
from attempts to adopt a binding code of conduct for TNCs and OECD's initiative for a 
Multilateral Investment Agreement. A new multilateral convention is both desirable and 
possible, but it will have to be balanced, fair, and realistic. 
141 To ensure that a multilateral treaty commands acceptance of a maximum number 
of states, it would be necessary to address such concerns felt by developed countries. De-
veloping countries will be well advised to show greater flexibility with respect to subjects 
deemed important by industrial countries. 
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D. Problem of the Concentration of Flows 
Even a universally accepted investment regime by itself will not 
bring about a wider geographical dispersal of capital flows. As already 
stated, with the exception of a handful of developing countries, most 
of the developing world fails to attract FDI on account of perceived 
high risks. In this regard, it would be very helpful if both general and 
project-specific schemes for risk sharing were redesigned with greater 
risk sharing by multilateral and government risk insurance organiza-
tions in source countries. However, even if countries that presently do 
not attract FDI have the possibility of insuring their risks, the fact that 
any risk can be theoretically insured does not"mean that insurance is 
affordable. Multilateral institutions and source countries should, 
therefore, seriously consider picking up a share of the cost of the risk 
in order to encourage wide geographical coverage of investments. 
The Monterrey Conference was cognizant of the need to en-
hance the number of countries that receive private capital flows, and 
the Consensus Document emphasized that: "[a]dditional source 
country measures should also be devised to encourage and facilitate 
investment flows to developing countries."142 The measures suggested 
above are thus in line with the thinking expressed in Monterrey. 
Developing countries also believe that partial risk guarantees of 
the World Bank and risk insurance by MIGA have only limited impact 
in encouraging private capital flows.143 They feel that a study should 
be undertaken if the Articles of Association of the World Bank and 
Charters of MIGA and the International Centre for Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (ICSID) need to be amended to bring about a spe-
cial momentum to private capital flows. 
A related issue is that of private financial flows, including foreign 
portfolio investment. The Monterrey Consensus, while underscoring 
the need to sustain private financial flows, calls for "[m]easures that 
mitigate the impact of excessive volatility of short-term capital flows. "144 
142 MoNTERREY CoNSENSUs, supra note 1, para. 22, at 6. 
145 See Report on the G-24 Workshop, supm note 91, at 7-8. 
144 MoNTERREY CoNSENsus, supra note 1, para. 25, at 6. 
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VI. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AS AN ENGINE FOR DEVELOPMENT 
A universal, rule based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilat-
eral trading system, as well as meaningful trade liberalization, can sub-
stantially stimulate development world wide, benefiting countries at all 
stages of development.145 
-The Monterrey Consensus Document 
A. Multilateral Rule-Based Trading System 
1. Benefits of Multilateral Systems and Liberalization 
257 
By reaffirming commitment to trade liberalization and reiterating 
the importance of a rule-based, nondiscriminatory multilateral trading 
system, the Monterrey Consensus has pointed out a very important 
route to worldwide prosperity and poverty eradication-liberalizing 
trade in areas particularly important to poor countries. This will not 
only significantly help developing countries to grow and achieve MDGs 
but will also add to the welfare of the developed countries, leading to a 
better allocation of resources and aiding consumers and tax payers in 
these countries through lower prices for food and other goods, and 
lower public expenditures on subsidies.146 
2. Role of International Economic Law 
The goal of multilateralism, however, is not just a matter of 
form.1 47 The spirit ofmultilateralism, which springs from a philosophy 
of cooperation, equity, and nondiscrimination, is expected to inform 
the entire process and lead to a better trading dispensation.148 Multi-
145 !d. para. 26, at 7. 
146 The case for free trade is too well known to require much amplification. Restric-
tions on flow of goods and services incontestably lead to distortion in allocation of re-
sources and prevent maximization of welfare. Agricultural subsidies exceeded US$300 
billion in 2000. See WoRLD BANK GROUP, DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND THE WTO: A HAND-
BOOK, at xxvii (Bernard M. Hoekman et al. eds., 2002). 
147 See Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the WTO Se-
curity Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a New Balance Be-
tween Sovereignty and Multilaterialism, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 413, 423 (2001) (explaining that 
the 1982 Ministerial Declaration supported multilateralism but failed to establish any real 
obligations). 
148 See Kevin C. Kennedy, 'Why Multilateralism Matters in Resolving Tmde-Environment Dis-
putes, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 31, 68 (2001) (suggesting that, since multilateralism is rule-
based, it will be helpful to developing countries because such nations need rules-based 
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lateralism is intended to foster a sense of real and substantive symme-
try, l49 which envisions meaningful participation in the process by all 
actors, irrespective of their size or weight in global trade. 150 Mere ad-
herence to the formal component is not sufficient.l5l Needs and con-
cerns of developing countries have to be meaningfully addressed 
through concrete action before any claim can be made about adop-
tion of a true multilateral trading system.152 
The multilateral trading system enshrined in the GATT /WTO 
Charters is an important manifestation of IEL in the contemporary 
world. Developing countries therefore look to IEL to assist them in 
further translating their vision into a viable legal framework with addi-
tions to and improvements of existing structure. Developing countries 
expect that principles of IEL will be embodied in the agreement to 
prevent, in particular, the misuse of legal processes as manifested in 
currently unjustified use of trade remedy procedures, such as anti-
dumping, countervailing measures, and mala fide prescription of ex-
cessively stringent import standards by industrial countries. It is in-
deed extremely critical to bring about a meaningful liberalization and 
enforce formal agreements on market access. 
B. Accord at Doha 
1. Implementing the Outcome ofthe Doha Accord 
To ensure that trade becomes a real engine for development, the 
Monterrey Conference called upon the members of the WTO to im-
plement the outcome of its Fourth Ministerial Conference held in 
Doha, Qatar, in November 2001.153 
regimes to help resolve disputes with developed nations in a predictable and consistent 
manner). 
149 See Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New 
Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT'L LJ. 419, 421-22 (explaining that the global 
trading system requires a new paradigm that is capable of overcoming deficiencies and 
outdated elements of earlier trade agreements). 
150 See Cann, supra note 147, at 418-19 (stating that the GAIT was designed to improve 
international trade by creating arrangements that were reciprocal and mutually advanta-
geous to the nations involved but concluding that the GAIT's true goal was to create addi-
tional global wealth). 
151 See id. (detailing how the GAIT/WTO sought to encourage free trade as a means to 
a more comprehensive end-that of increasing wealth on a global scale). 
152 See John 0. McGinnis, World Trade Agreements: Advancing the Interests of the Poorest of 
Poor, 34 IND. L. REv. 1361, 1362 (2001) (arguing that multilateralism is beneficial to poor 
and developing nations and acts as attractive bait to leaders of despotic regimes). 
153 See MoNTERREY CoNSENSUS, supra note 1, para. 29, at 7. 
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Mter protracted negotiations, the Doha Ministerial (to which the 
Monterrey document refers) reached a productive consensus encapsu-
lated in the Doha Declaration. WTO members also decided to open a 
new round of trade talks focused on the needs of developing countries, 
the so-called "development round."154 The Declaration acknowledges 
the positive contribution of the "multilateral trading" system in foster-
ing economic growth and development,155 articulates the determina-
tion to maintain the process of reform and liberalization of trade poli-
cies, and contains a pledge to reject the use of protectionism.! 56 
2. Concerns of Developing Countries on the Eve of the Doha 
Conference 
Mter their experience with the Uruguay Round and the Seattle 
fiasco, many developing countries came to Doha with a lot of skepti-
cism. In evaluating the Doha Accord, it is helpful to recall the con-
cerns and priorities of these countries at the beginning of the Minis-
terial Conference. Developing countries wanted, above all, enhanced 
market access for their goods and services.157 They also sought the 
faithful implementation (both in letter and spirit) of commitments 
made in the Uruguay Round and increased flexibility in the applica-
tion of WTO rules. 158 They wan ted meaningful action for liberalizing 
trade in agriculture and phasing out subsidies (though some food-
importing developing countries wanted special exemptions due to 
non-trade concerns) .159 
154 See generally Ministerial Conference, 4th Sess., Ministe1ial Declaration, WT /MIN (01) I 
DEC/I (Nov. 20, 2001) (acknowledging the many areas that the Doha conference at-
tempted to address) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
155 !d. para. 1. 
156 !d. (announcing the ideals of the declaration as agreed upon by the participants). 
157 See A.V. Ganesan, Seattle and Beyond: Devewping-Country Perspectives, in THE WTO AFTER 
SEATILE 85 (Jefferey Schott ed., 2000) (stating that the central element to the developing 
countries' strategy is now to gain access to markets and compete in the world marketplace). 
158 See id. at 87 (arguing that increased flexibility in the application and definition of 
rules would help developing countries create plans that satisfy their particular needs). 
Critical implementation issues relate to textiles and clothing, anti-dumping, and the TRIPS 
Agreement, but developing countries were equally interested in the built-in agenda sectors 
of agriculture, services, and intellectual property. See World Trade Organization, Doha 
WTO Ministerial 2001: Briefing Notes, Implementation Issues Central to WTO Future 
Work Programme, at http:/ /www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minOl_e/brief_e/ 
brief07_e.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2004) (stating that, for many developing nations, "ca-
pacity constraints have been a major obstacle to the full implementation of Uruguay 
Round agreements"). 
159 Mr. Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla, a Senior Fellow at the International Food Policy Research 
Institute, addresses how trade liberalization affects the agricultural sector of developing 
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Regarding services, developing countries pleaded for greater 
movement of natural persons.16° Under the TRIPS Agreement, they 
sought both correction of imbalances and substantial review of the 
existing accord. 16l They were apprehensive about incorporating non-
trade issues, such as environmental and labor standards, within the 
WfQ.l62 
C. Doha Work Program: Covering Three Kinds of Issues 
The work program agreed to at Doha is contained in three sepa-
rate documents: (1) the Main Declaration; (2) the Declaration on the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement) and Public Health; and (3) a Decision on Im-
plementation. Negotiations under the work program must conclude 
by January 2005 (except in case of dispute settlement, for which the 
deadline is earlier). 163 However, due to a lack of progress at the 
Cancun Conference, this deadline is likely to be missed. 
countries in the short term. He discusses that the effects of trade liberalization are debated, 
with disagreement as to whether it causes or reduces hunger. Indeed, though calories per 
capita may have increased since the 1960s, needs are still not met for around twenty-five per-
cent of the developing world, including sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia. Description to 
Global Dialogues on Sustainable Development Series: Food Security: The Impact of Climate 
Change and Trade Liberalization Part 1 (B-Span Video, Oct. 23, 2001), at http:/ I 
info.worldbank.org/ etools/bspan/Presentation View.asp?PID= 234&EID= 121 (also pointing 
out that increases in food imports have been accompanied by increases in food exports). 
160 See World Trade Organization, Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Briefing Notes, Trade 
in Services: The Work Programme and the Current Negotiations, at http:/ /www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/brief_e/brief06_e.htrn (last visited Apr. 29, 2004) 
(stating that the negotiating countries wanted to liberalize sections of the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services, including the annexes that cover the movement of natural 
persons who engage in services in another country). 
161 See Like Minded Group Sets Out Positions Before Doha, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS 
DIG., jul. 10, 2001 (stating that developing countries believe that the problems and imbal-
ances with private profits and public policies should be redressed along with certain tech-
nology transfer obligations). 
162 See Ganesan, supra note 157, at 87 (noting that developing nations are concerned 
about including environmental and labor issues in the agenda). 
163 World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement, at http:/ /www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htrn (last visited Apr. 29, 2004) (noting that the dispute settle-
ment deadline was extended from May 2003 to May 2004); World Trade Organization, 
How the Negotiations Are Organized, at http:/ /www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/ 
work_organi_e.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2004). 
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1. Recognition of Developing Countries' Needs 
Developing countries can indeed draw comfort from the follow-
ing part of the Declaration: 
We recognize the need for all our peoples to benefit from 
the increased opportunities and welfare gains that the multi-
lateral trading system generates. The majority of WTO 
members are developing countries. We seek to place their 
needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme 
adopted in this Declaration .... In this context, enhanced 
market access, balanced rules, and well targeted, sustainably 
financed technical assistance and capacity-building pro-
grammes have important roles to play,l64 
The Monterrey Consensus reaffirmed a commitment "to trade liber-
alization and to ensure that trade plays its full part in promoting eco-
nomic growth, employment and development for all. "165 It also wel-
comed WTO decisions "to place the needs and interests of developing 
countries at the heart of its work programme, and commit to their 
implementation. "166 
2. Chances of Operational Fulfillment 
Brave words and noble sentiments in the Doha Declaration, fully 
echoed in the Monterrey Consensus, are assuringly full of references 
to a concrete plank of intended actions in the Declaration. The criti-
cal question, however, is whether this eloquent articulation will re-
main confined to the preamble to Doha Declaration or whether it will 
see a reasonable operational fulfillment. Only the course of negotia-
tions will furnish a definitive answer. However, a positive development 
has occurred regarding the specific issue of implementation of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements. The decision on implementation issues 
raised by the developing countries indicated that a number of these 
problems had been resolved or were near resolution. 167 As for the 
164 See Doha Declaration, supra note 154, para. 2 (pledging that the Declaration seeks 
to protect the interests of the developing countries and, most importantly, the least devel-
oped countries around the world). 
165 MoNTERREY CoNSENSUS, supra note 1, para. 26, at 7. 
166 ld. 
167 The difference in perspectives of industrial and developing countries on the im-
plementation issue persists. Most of the developing countries probably would have pre-
ferred more definite and stronger language in the Declaration. 
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rest, nearly fifty issues were transformed from unilateral requests into 
multilateral commitments to negotiate. 
3. Uruguay, Doha, and Cancun: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back 
The Uruguay Round negotiations attempted to reduce subsidies 
and protections in the agricultural sector. In November 2001, at its 
Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, the WTO's declaration 
mandated negotiations on several trade issues-including agriculture 
and those services delineated in the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services-and aimed to finish negotiations by January 2005. Progress 
should have been assessed at the September 2003 Fifth Ministerial 
Conference in Cancun, Mexico, but negotiations collapsed. In view of 
this breakdown, Timothy Josling, Senior Fellow at the Stanford Insti-
tute for International Studies, emphasizes the growing role of devel-
oping countries, especially in the period between the Uruguay Round 
and the Doha meetings.l6B 
Following the Doha conference, countries were to start negotiat-
ing modalities for which subsidies and tariffs to cut (and by how 
much); these modalities, which would evolve into obligations, were to 
be determined by March 2003. The deadline was not met, however, 
andJosling notes that this may have resulted in the eventual failure of 
the Cancun meetings.169 Two different proposals were then made at 
the Cancun meetings: one was agreed upon by the EU and the United 
States, and a counter proposal was agreed upon by Brazil, China, In-
dia, and the G-21 (a group of twenty other developing countries).170 
As for the resulting General Council draft, objections from many 
groups prevented any agreement from being finalized. The United 
States viewed the draft as unbalanced, because it permitted develop-
ing countries to avoid opening their markets. Other countries consid-
ered the tariff cuts as too extensive, and the G-21 countries, thinking 
that their ideas had been diluted, were not pleased either.171 Josling's 
opinion, however, is that the ultimate cause of the Cancun breakdown 
was "the inclusion of the 'Singapore Issues' regarding trade and com-
168 Description to Overview of the Current WfO Agricultural Negotiations (B-Span 
Video, Sept. 16, 2003), at http:/ /info.worldbank.org/etools/bSPAN/presentationView. 
asp?EID=452&PID=862. 
169 !d. 
170 !d. 
!7! Id. 
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petition, trade and investment, trade facilitation, and transparency in 
government procurement. "172 
VII. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AssiSTANCE (ODA) 
We recog;nize that a substantial increase in ODA and other resources will be 
required if developing countries are to achieve the internationally agreed 
development goals . . . .173 
-The Monterrey Consensus Document 
A. ODA: A Core Element of the Monterrey Consensus 
1. Largest Source of Financing for Many Countries 
ODA forms one of the core elements of the Monterrey Consen-
sus. Its role in supporting sectors such as education, health, public 
infrastructure, rural development, and food security-which are cru-
cial for improving the welfare of the recipients-is fully acknowl-
edged.l74 It is also accepted that for many developing countries, ODA 
is still the largest source of external financing.l75 Even more impor-
tantly, it is critical to achieving the MDGs as well as other internation-
ally agreed development targets. Thus, a clear nexus has been estab-
lished between ODA and poverty alleviation, and its adequacy and 
efficacy should be judged on the basis of its contribution to the reali-
zation of specific goals.I76 
l72 I d. Josling's view is that the negotiations will probably not be completed on time, 
partly because of the "lack of political will" and approaching elections that many countries 
face. He also states that the Canciin breakdown revealed, among other things, that "em-
phasis on a European Union-United States deal as key proved misleading, developing 
countries have become convinced that they can have an impact, and developed countries 
are still tied to domestic constituencies." Id. 
173 MONTERREY CONSENSUS, supra note 1, para. 41, at 9. 
174 Id. para. 39, at 9. 
11s Jd. 
176 Nicholas Stern, Trade, Aid and Results: Can We Make a Difference?, Address to the An-
nual Bank Conference on Development Economics in Europe (May 15, 2003), available at 
http:/ /econ.worldbank.org/files/27367_Trade_Aid_and_Results-ABCDE_Europe_Speech.pdf 
("In addition, the poverty-reduction effectiveness of ODA has grown rapidly as well. In 1990, 
another $1 billion allocated to ODA would have lifted 105,000 people permanently out of pov-
erty; by 1997-98, the same increment would have lifted 284,000, a near tripling in aid 'produc-
tivity.' The Bank's IDA funds are especially well-targeted towards poverty reduction. Even in 
1990, more IDA funds went to countries with good policies ($4.7 per capita versus $2)-by the 
late 1990s, good-policy countries received 3 times as much per capita as counties with inade-
quate policies."). 
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2. Effectiveness of ODA 
The absence of a clear link between ODA and poverty alleviation 
was viewed with deep concern in the past. Motivation for extending 
ODA had been, at least during the Cold War era, predominantly politi-
cal-for winning friends and influencing governments-and not pri-
marily for helping the disadvantaged in recipient countries.177 Poverty 
alleviation, if achieved, was essentially incidental. There is, however, 
some ground of comfort in a recent research study by the World Bank: 
[P]roblems and disappointments notwithstanding, aid has 
generally helped poor countries in their efforts to reduce 
poverty. Moreover, aid is more effective at reducing poverty 
today than ever before, due to improvements in poor coun-
tries' policies, institutions, and governance (changes that aid 
has helped to support), and due to better allocation of aid 
since the end ofthe Cold WarP8 
B. Shrinking Volumes and the Impact on Poverty 
1. Substantial Decline in ODA 
Despite this positive scorecard, there will not be a significant dif-
ference in outcomes unless much is done to correct disturbing trends 
and negative features of ODA as it stands today. The last fifteen years 
have witnessed a substantial decline in international aid. Net ODA 
declined from US$58.5 billion in 1994 to US$48.5 billion in 1999.179 
Between 1992 and 1997, it declined from 0.33% of the donors' GNP 
to 0.22%.180 Even though the trend stabilized in 1998, (due to some 
emergency provision of aid for the East Asia crisis), it is still stagnating 
177 See ANNE BoscHINI & ANDERS OLOFSGARD, FoREIGN Am: AN INSTRUMENT FOR 
FIGHTING PoVERTY oR CoMMUNisM? (2001), http:/ /info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/vod-
docs/155/336/olofsgard.pdf. 
178 Stern, Making the Case, supra note 111, at 17. 
179 ORGANIZATION FOR EcoNOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE DACjoUR-
NAL, DEVELOPMENT Co-OPERATION REPORT: EFFORTS AND PoLICIES OF THE MEMBERS OF 
THE DEVELOPMENT AssiSTANCE CoMMITTEE 60 (2001). 
180 See IAN GoLDEN ET AL., WoRLD BANK, THE RoLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF DEVELOP-
MENT AssiSTANCE: LESSONS FROM WORLD BANK EXPERIENCE (2002), http:/ /econ.world-
bank.org I files/ 13080 _ The_Role_and_Effectiveness_of_Developmen t_Assistance.pdf ( pa-
per presented at the U.N. International Conference on Financing for Development, Mon-
terrey, Mexico, Mar. 18-22, 2002). 
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around 0.23% of donors' GNP per capita. 181 Moreover, concessional 
resource flow to the developing world fell by nearly one third in the 
1990s.l82 In 1990, US$32.27 was the amount of aid per developing 
country resident, and this figure fell to US$22.41 per resident in 
1997.183 With the Monterrey Conference, it seems that the downward 
cycle in ODA flows has been reversed though commitments made that 
are yet to be translated into deeds. Developing countries hope that 
announcements made by the United States and the European Union 
at the Conference represent abiding commitments and signifY lasting 
change in their policies.l84 
The apprehension of developing countries should be understood 
in this context because the least developed countries have suffered the 
most from the severe decline in ODA in terms of per capita.l85 While 
181 See Elizabeth Lule, Resource Mobilization for NGOs, Presentation at the EuroNGOs 
Annual Meeting (Oct. 2-4, 2003). 
182 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Two Principles for the Next Round or, How to Bring Developing Countries 
in from the Cold, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO: A PRo-AcTIVE AGENDA 7 
(2001) (citing the World Bank's Statistical Information and Management Analysis data-
base). 
183 Id. 
184 The most fruitful short-term result was the unofficial bidding contest between the 
United States and the European Union (EU) on to increase their ODA commitments. 
Before Monterrey, during a meeting in Barcelona, the EU countries committed themselves 
to reach an average ODA equivalent to 0.39% of national output by 2006, with individual 
countries reaching at least 0.33%-a commitment representing at least an extra $7 billion 
by 2006 and some $20 billion during 2000-2006 (total EU ODA was $25.4 billion during 
2000). In what was considered an abrupt change in policy, U.S. President George W. Bush 
pledged to increase ODA by 50%, also by 2006, to $15 billion per year, with some of the 
extra funding becoming available within the next year. See OXFORD ANALYTICA LTD., BRIEF 
oN MoNTERREY CoNSENsus (2004). 
185 James D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank Group, states: 
Current levels of aid [directed towards LDCs in Mrica, for example]. at 0.22 
percent of annual GDP, fall far below the 0.7 percent target OECD countries 
pledged to meet. It is ironic that when Mrican leaders are putting the right 
policies in place and showing results, overseas aid to Mrica has fallen from 
$34 per person in 1990 to $18 per person in 1998 .... [Meeting the 0.7 tar-
get] would make a difference [o]f $100 billion a year. It could make a pro-
found difference in the number of people who die each year of preventable 
or treatable diseases. It is the right thing to do, for LDCs, for donor countries 
and for the world. Some advanced countries have met their ODA commit-
ments of 0. 7 percent of GDP; the rest must now step up and meet theirs 
A New Compact to Meet the Challenge of Global Poverty, Speech at the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Least Developed Countries (May 14, 2001), at http:/ /web.world-
bank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/PRESIDENTEXTERN 
AL/O,contentMDK:20023997-menuPK:232083-pagePK:159837-piPK:159808-theSitePK:227 
585,00.htrnl. 
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the income gap between aflluent countries has continued to widen, the 
generosity of donor countries has continued to shrink. From 1960 to 
1990, ODA provided by major donors decreased from 0.5% of their 
gross national income to 0.34%-falling to 0.22% by 2001-and the 
promise made by high-income countries in the Monterrey Consensus 
was to increase ODA to 0.26% by 2006.186 Ironically, this overall decline 
occurred at a time when ODA should have increased, considering, for 
example, the sustained focus on poverty reduction at several recent 
U.N. conferences. Further, an increasing number of developing coun-
tries were attempting to improve economic and political governance, 
which should have improved the prospects of better utilization of aid. 
2. Estimates for Required Poverty Reduction 
According to data provided by the World Bank, about 1.1 billion 
people (or twenty percent of the world's population) live on less than 
US$1.00 per day.187 The only MDG that might be met by 2015 is the 
goal of halving income poverty; however, under current poverty 
growth rates, by that time, half of the world's poor may be found in 
Sub-Saharan Mrican countries.188 In order to help alleviate poverty in 
developing countries and meet the MDGs, richer countries will thus 
have to be more generous in increasing aid and liberalizing global 
trade. Poverty includes not only a lack of money but also other harsh 
consequences: "Poor people lack control over their lives; they are vul-
nerable to economic shocks, natural disasters, violence and crime. 
They are often denied access to an education, adequate health serv-
ices and clean water and sanitation. "189 
Doubling the amount of ODA is not an unachievable goal. Re-
sources can be mobilized provided that there is the will to find them. 
Industrialized countries spend nearly US$360 billion a year on agri-
cultural subsidies alone, not including huge defense expenditures.l90 
As Jeffrey Sachs pertinently points out: "If the world, and the United 
186 See DevNews Media Center, Poverty, at http:/ /web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTER-
NAL/NEWS/O,contentMDK:20040961-menuPK:3448G-pagePK:3437G-theSitePK:4607,00.html 
(last modified Mar. 2004). 
187 See id. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 See James D. Wolfensohn, Remarks at the Conference on Making Globalization Work 
for All, (Feb. 16, 2004), at http:/ /web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/ 
O,contentMDK:20169719-menuPK:344 72-pagePK:3437G-piPK:34424-theSitePK:4607 ,OO.ht 
ml ("A thousand billion dollars military expenditure, fifty billion dollars for hope."). 
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States and other industrialized countries in particular, allocated a 
small share of their military expenses to easing the needs of the 
world's poorest populations, our generation could free mankind from 
poverty's iron stronghold. "191 
As things stand, even after the Monterrey Conference, there re-
mains a significant gap between the aid pledged by rich countries and 
what is needed. The imperative now is, "as aid dollars are invested more 
wisely, to close that gap. "192 Whatever qualitative changes and reforms 
are implemented, particularly to increase productivity and effectiveness 
of aid (changes advocated continuously by the United States), a sub-
stantial quantitative increase is essential. Quantity or quality cannot be 
substitutes for each other. Improvements in both of these aspects are 
required. In recognizing that a substantial increase in ODA and further 
improvement in national and international policies and development 
strategies will be required, the Monterrey Consensus urged developed 
countries that have not done so to make efforts towards the target of 
0.7% of GNP as ODA to developing countries.193 
C. Issues of Focus and Predictability 
1. Greater Allocation to Poorest Countries 
The overarching goal of poverty reduction should determine the 
quantum of ODA flows and their destination. ODA should be allo-
cated more equitably and responsively to the poorest nations. "The 
international community has come a long way in understanding what 
makes aid more effective, focusing on the selection of recipient coun-
tries .... [A]long with selectivity, the way donors provide their aid 
matters a lot. "194 
191 Jeffrey D. Sachs, LEs EcHos, Les nantis devraient tenir parole, Mar. 11, 2002. 
192 Forging the Monterrey Consensus, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2002, § 4, at 14. 
193 MoNTERREY CoNSENsus, supra note 1, para. 42, at 9. 
194 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004: MAKING SERVICES WoRK FOR PooR PEOPLE 
203 (2003), http:/ /econ.worldbank.org/wdr/wdr2004/text-30023/. The effectiveness of 
ODA can be also increased even more through untying. This process has already started, 
with the recent OECD agreement to untie all financial aid to the least developed coun-
tries. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Untying Aid to the 
Least Developed Countries: The OECD/DAC Recommendation, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/ 
document/24/0,2340,en_2649_34643_2068440_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2004). 
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2. Predictability, Continuity, and Certainty of Flows 
It is also very important to make resource flows "predictable, con-
tinuous and increasingly assured. "195 Resource transfers from rich to 
poor nations should not remain manifestations of periodic voluntary 
generosity, but should be automatic. There should be a framework 
based on internationally accepted needs of the poor rather than on 
the uncertain generosity of the rich.I96 Continuity and predictability 
of aid flow is indeed imperative to sustain poverty reduction efforts. 
Many poor countries will require assistance for a long time before 
they will be able to effectively eradicate poverty, and they can succeed 
only if they receive a continuous inflow of resources from abroad.19' 
D. Recipients' Rnle in Aid Effectiveness 
1. Importance of Institutions, Governance, and Policies 
Experience has shown that, in the ultimate analysis, aid effective-
ness largely depends on strong institutions, good governance, and 
sound policies of the recipient countries. In countries with sound 
economic management, aid has led to higher private investment, 
more rapid growth, and a faster decline in poverty. The policies 
adopted by developing countries thus contribute significantly to aid 
effectiveness and strong economic performance,l98 Therefore, the 
impact of aid has been very different across countries. Incomes still 
fall in some countries that receive a lot of aid but increase in other 
countries. There is a strong case for directing aid flows to countries 
with policies and institutions conducive to reducing poverty. It has 
been estimated that an across-the-board US$10 billion increase in aid 
195 RUBEN P. MENDEZ, GLOBAL TAXATION: THE RISE, DECLINE AND FUTURE OF AN IDEA 
AT THE UNITED NATIONs 4 (lnstitut du developpement durable et des relations interna-
tionales, Working Paper, 2002), http:/ /www.iddri.org/iddri/telecharge/fiscalite/mendez. 
pdf (quoting G.A Res. 3362 (S-VII) o£16 September 1975). 
196 MAHBUB U. HAQ, THE POVERTY CURTAIN: CHOICES FOR THE THIRD WoRLD 204 
(1976). 
197 These countries suffer from an acute paucity of resources and thus cannot invest in 
infrastructure (to aid stimulation of growth) or in the social sector for human resource 
development. Inflow of concessional resources must be fairly long-term before these coun-
tries can stand on their own feet. WoRLD BANK AssESSING Am 44 (1998). 
198 Seiichi Kondo, Statement at the International Conference on Financing for Devel-
opment, Monterrey, Mexico (Mar. 18, 2002) at http:/ /www.un.org/ffd/statements/oecdE. 
htm ("Certainly money will be needed to turn the tide against poverty and achieve the goals 
of the Millennium Declaration, but good policies and sound institutions are equally impor-
tant."). 
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would lift seven million people out of poverty, while a targeted in-
crease would lift twenty-five million people out ofpoverty.I99 
2. Accord on Recipients' Responsibilities 
Fully recognizing the importance of improvements on the part of 
developing countries, the Monterrey Consensus contains a commit-
ment by them to work for sustained economic growth, achieve good 
governance, adopt sound macroeconomic and prudent fiscal policies, 
improve infrastructure, fight corruption at all levels, and build solid 
democratic institutions that are responsive to the needs of the peo-
ple.200 It has thus called upon all the stakeholders-both developed 
and developing countries-to make ODA more effective and 
identifies various concrete measures for achieving this objective.201 
E. A New Paradigm for ODA 
1. Building Blocks for a New ODA Architecture 
The call for substantial increase in the quantity of aid coupled 
with a plea for enhancing its effectiveness (and elaborated with very 
sound concrete suggestions), embodied in a historic consensus 
document, augur well for ODA. The Monterrey Consensus contains 
building blocks for a new ODA architecture. It has crystallized a new 
understanding shared by developing and developed countries, which 
has made it possible for the world leaders who attended the historic 
Monterrey Summit to "promise to work together in a deeper partner-
ship for development."2°2 Moreover, 
[d]eveloping countries declared their determination to con-
tinue to strengthen their policies, institutions, and govern-
ance, in order to improve their investment climates and in-
vest in their people, thereby providing the framework neces-
sary for rapid, sustained, poverty-reducing growth. Rich 
countries reaffirmed their willingness to open their markets 
further to exports from poor countries and to increase 
199 Janet Bush, Stability is the Key to a Third World Aid, TIMES (London), Nov. 11, 1998. 
2oo MoNTERREY CoNSENsus, supra note 1, paras. 10-19, at 29-35. 
2o1 Id. para. 42, at 44-48. 
202 Stern, Making the Case, supra note ll1, at 17. 
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financial assistance to poor nations that have shown that they 
can use it well. 203 
2. Transformation of ODA into a Binding Obligation 
The ODA architecture finalized in Monterrey represents remark-
able progress. However, there are some vital, conceptual parts missing 
that need to be imported in order to construct a durable structure that 
will be able to withstand winds and storms caused by changing fads and 
priorities. What is required is a new paradigm for ODA that will trans-
form it from an uncertain, inadequate, shrinking, and unfocused char-
ity of nations into an adequate, predictable, long-term, focused, and 
binding obligation of the world community, embedded in international 
law and aimed at poverty reduction. For rich countries, this obligation 
would require, inter alia, providing adequate development assistance to 
the poor countries. For developing countries, this obligation would re-
quire, for example, fulfilling international conditions and meeting per-
formance criteria to ensure the most productive and honest use of de-
velopment assistance to achieve poverty reduction. 
3. Right to Development: Lending Additional Validity to Entitlement 
The right of poor countries to receive ODA and the obligation of 
rich countries to assist them derive their validity and force from the 
right to development, recognized by the U.N. General Assembly in 
1979, reiterated a number of times, and, ultimately, enshrined in the 
Declaration on the Right to Development in 1986, which proclaimed 
the right to development to be "an inalienable human right by virtue 
of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to partici-
pate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and politi-
cal development."204 
Again, the Millennium Declaration of 2000 contained a clear 
commitment to make the right to development a reality for everyone. 
The Heads of State and Government of the U.N. member countries 
(both from developed and developing nations) at the Millennium 
Summit committed to "spare no effort to free our fellow men, women 
and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme 
203 ld. 
204 Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, 41st Sess., 97th plen. mtg., 
Supp. No. 53, Annex, Agenda Item 101, art. 1.1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (1986). 
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poverty."2°5 It also declared that "[n]o individual and no nation must be 
denied the opportunity to benefit from development."206 This une-
quivocal recognition of the right to development (which earlier en-
countered some reservations) and commitment to fight poverty give 
rise to an obligation on the part of every country to eradicate poverty. 
4. Crossing the Conceptual Divide 
No doubt, the proposed paradigm envisaging transformation of 
the purely volitional nature of ODA subventions into obligatory com-
mitments is a challenge to the will and creativity of the international 
community. This also poses a challenge to IEL. In the context of con-
verting resource transfers from charitable impulses to obligations, the 
role of law is not confined to the mere adoption of certain techniques, 
but represents the crossing of a conceptual and operational divide. 
However, a similar development has taken place in the past, with legal 
processes effectuating transfers of income from the affiuent to the dis-
advantaged at the domestic level of many nation states. For example, in 
place of private philanthropy, nation states have adopted social security 
laws, because a system of mere charitable resource transfers would be 
unsatisfactory. Once such transfers are made obligatory on the interna-
tional level, legal processes become indispensable, a change that has 
already occurred at the domestic level. 
5. Basis of Transformation in International Law 
As to the response of international law beyond the incipient rec-
ognition of an inchoate duty of samaritanism, it is worth noting that 
this duty has already matured, albeit partially, at this point in time. 
This transformation is occurring as a consequence of: 
(a) clear norms of international law establishing a clear duty of states 
to cooperate for a supranational welfare system; 
(b) recognition of developing countries as special entities entitled to 
affirmative action on the part of the affiuent countries; and 
(c) conceptual and factual acceptance of entitlement based on need. 
Although the concept of "obligation to cooperate"2°7 was discussed in 
Part III, a few words in amplification are necessary. Even if one re-
2os Millennium Declaration, supra note 6, para. 11. 
2°6 Id. para 6. 
207 See discussion supra Part ITI. 
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gards some of the NIEO documents as controversial, it is clear that 
resolutions adopted unanimously prior to 1976 as well as those 
adopted later on-for example, the Millennium Declaration and 
Monterrey Consensus-reflect the recognition of an obligation to co-
operate. Further, the duty to cooperate will make sense only if it is 
translated into concrete transfers of concessional resources from rich 
members of the world community to its less fortunate members for 
alleviation of their degrading misery. 
A series of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions coupled with 
unanimously adopted Declarations create a certain expectation with 
regard to legal developments. Regarding ODA, expectations gener-
ated by the U.N. Charter and resolutions have not only remained 
confined to the realm of ideas, but have found a concrete expression 
in the practice of affiuent countries. A concept of international enti-
tlement to aid based on need has gained a measure of acceptance. 
What is striking about this concept is not its espousal by the large ma-
jority of poor nations, but the fact that it has been accepted by 
affluent countries that, alone, can provide necessary resources. Ac-
tions of rich countries in extending assistance and sustaining it for a 
period of several decades have convincingly established state practice. 
Though it may well be the case that these actions fall short of meeting 
actual requirements of many of recipient countries, the scale and du-
ration of responses have been substantial enough to demonstrate the 
practical acceptance of a responsibility based on the entitlement of 
those in need and, by the same token, an obligation for those who can 
help. 
It would be, however, relevant to note that there is a wide variety of 
obligations. Some of them have evolved into what may be called "hard-
core''208 obligations-duties entailing severe negative sanctions in the 
event of nonfulfillment-while others remain "soft-core"209 obligations, 
the breach of which may give rise to sanctions that are less harsh. De-
veloping countries do not expect that hard-core obligations will emerge 
in respect of ODA, but even soft-core obligations, as a follow-up to 
Monterrey, would represent a great milestone and would effectively 
mark the beginning of the paradigm shift advocated by the authors. 
2os Haque, supra note 47, at 421-422; see also Oscar Schacter, Towards a Theory of Interna-
tional Obligation, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS 30 (S. Schwebel ed., 
1971). 
209 Haque, supra note 47, at 421-422. 
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VII. EXTERNAL DEBT 
External debt relief can play a key role in liberating resources that can then 
be directed towards activities consistent with attaining sustainable l!;rowth 
and develapment . ... 210 
-The Monterrey Consensus Document 
A. Extremely Serious Problems 
1. Debt Relief for Development 
273 
External debt is an extremely serious problem faced by a large 
number of developing countries. Debt burden has affected their abil-
ity to access sufficient funds to invest in productive activities necessary 
for achieving developmental goals. Many of these countries are really 
trapped in the vicious cycle of poverty because a large portion of their 
GDP must be spent on debt servicing, leaving little for anything else. 
The Monterrey Consensus rightly recognizes sustainable debt 
financing as an important element for mobilizing resources for public 
and private investment, and it further states: "National comprehensive 
strategies to monitor and manage external debt liabilities, embedded 
in the domestic preconditions for debt sustainability, including sound 
macroeconomic policies and public resource management, are a key 
element in reducing national vulnerabilities. Debtors and creditors 
must share the responsibility for preventing and resolving unsustain-
able debt situations. "211 Therefore, debt relief measures, where ap-
propriate, should be pursued vigorously and expeditiously, including 
within the Paris and London Clubs and other relevant fora.212 
2. Enhanced HIPC Initiative 
The Monterrey Consensus welcomed mitiattves undertaken to 
reduce outstanding indebtedness and called for further national and 
international measures, including, as appropriate, debt cancellation 
and other arrangements. It found that the enhanced Heavily In-
debted Poor Countries' (HIPC) initiative had provided an opportu-
nity to strengthen the economic prospects and poverty eradication 
efforts of its beneficiary countries. An earnest plea was made for 
210 MoNTERREY CONSENSUS, supra note 1, para. 48, at 11. 
m I d. para. 4 7, at 11. 
212 See id. para. 15, at 4. 
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speedy, effective, and full implementation of the initiative, and it was 
recommended that it should be fully financed through additional re-
sources. The Monterrey Consensus further emphasized that the eligi-
bility criteria should remain flexible and that debt relief arrange-
ments should avoid imposing unfair burdens on other developing 
countries.213 It also encouraged exploring innovative mechanisms to 
comprehensively address debt problems of other developing countries, 
including middle-income countries and countries with economies in 
transition.214 It very appropriately asked donor countries to ensure that 
resources provided for debt relief should not detract from ODA re-
sources intended to be available for developing countries.215 
3. The Need for Additional Funds 
Within the broad framework of achieving poverty reduction, the 
HIPC debt initiative is the first comprehensive approach to reduce 
the external debt of the world's poorest countries, which are also 
heavily indebted.216 A major review in 1999 resulted in an enhance-
ment of the initial plan. Developing countries, while welcoming the 
steady progress made in the implementation of the enhanced initia-
tive, have been expressing their disappointment that only six out of 
thirty-eight countries have reached the completion point.217 They are 
also concerned that, owing to factors largely beyond their control 
(overly ambitious export, target, and growth assumptions, falling 
commodity prices, and the global slowdown), many HIPCs are likely 
at the completion point to have debt ratios in excess of the initiative 
threshold.218 Therefore, there is a need to secure additional resources 
21s See id. para. 43, at 10. 
214 See id. para. 51, at 12. 
215 MoNTERREY CoNSENSUS, supra note 1, para. 51, at 12. 
216 The HIPC initiative was proposed by the World Bank and IMF in 1996. It represents 
an important step in placing debt relief within an overall framework of poverty reduction. 
The HIPC approach, now improved and termed as Enhanced HIPC Debt Initiative, pro-
vides an opportunity to strengthen economic prospects and poverty reduction efforts in its 
beneficiary countries. 
217 Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development 
Communique, International Monetary Fund, para. 11, at 4 (Sept. 27, 2002), available at http:/ I 
www.imf.org/external/np/cm/2002/092702.htm [hereinafter lntergovermnental Group of 
Twenty-Four]. 
218 /d. ("While welcoming the steady progress being made in the implementation of 
the HIPC Initiative, Ministers reiterate their disappointment that only 6 out of 38 eligible 
countries have reached their completion point and that some creditors have not fully 
joined the process. Additional funding will be required to address HIPCto-HIPC debt 
relief. Ministers are concerned that, owing to factors largely beyond their control, namely 
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for topping up debt relief funds. Concern has been specifically ex-
pressed about the financing gap in the HIPC Trust Fund.219 Aside 
from the need to address problems in implementing this initiative, 
developing countries have been pleading for relief to certain coun-
tries-which may be HIPC ineligible or have not opted for the HIPC 
solution for some valid reasons-that find themselves in an extremely 
serious situation on account of huge external debt overhang. 
B. Sovereign Debt Issue 
[We] would welcome consideration by all relevant stakeholders of an inter-
national debt workout mechanism, in the appropriate forums, that will en-
gage debtors and creditors to come together to restructure unsustainable 
debts in a timely and efficient manner.220 
-The Monterrey Consensus Document 
1. Need for Improved Restructuring of Sovereign Debt 
I 
The present system of restructuring unsustainable sovereign debt 
is evidently flawed and requires immediate remedial action. The Mon-
terrey Consensus thus encouraged development of a better interna-
tional debt mechanism. A welcome initiative has been taken in this re-
gard in the form of a proposal entitled "A New Approach to Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring"221-authored by Anne Krueger, Deputy Managing 
Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-which envisages a 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). The proposal seeks 
to correct negative features of the current voluntary debt restructuring 
process, which has been found to be excessively lengthy, unpredictable, 
and damaging to both the debtor country and its creditors: 
First, sovereigns waft too long before seeking a restructuring, 
leaving both their citizens and cre_ditors worse off. Second, 
when they finally do opt for restructuring, the process takes 
overly ambitious export and growth assumptions, falling commodity prices and the global 
slowdown, many HIPCs are likely to have debt ratios in excess of the HIPC Initiative 
threshold at the completion point. In this context, Ministers stress the need to secure addi-
tional resources for topping-up debt relief and to streamline conditions and retain more 
realistic projections associated with debt relief.") 
219 /d. 
22° MONTERREY CONSENSUS, supra note 1, para. 60, at 14. 
221 See generally ANNE KRuEGER, INTERNATIONAL MoNETARY FuND, A NEW APPROACH 
TO SoVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 1-5 (2002), available at http:/ /www.imf.org/exter-
nal/pubs/ft/ exrp/ sdrm/ eng/ sdrm. pdf. 
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longer than needed and is less predictable than debtors and 
creditors would like.222 
The new proposal is intended to facilitate an orderly, predictable, and 
rapid restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debt, and to simulta-
neously protect asset values and creditor's rights. It is also hoped that 
such a mechanism would contribute to the overall efficiency of inter-
national capital markets because it would reduce restructuring costs 
for sovereign debtors and their creditors.223 The existing mechanism, 
while having the international community bail out private creditors, 
entails the moral dilemma of making it possible for these creditors to 
get away free.224 Krueger's proposed system addresses this concern: 
Our aim would be to create a catalyst that will encourage 
debtors and creditors to come together to restructure unsus-
tainable debts in a timely and efficient manner. This catalyst 
would take the form of a framework offering a debtor coun-
try legal protection from creditors that stand in the way of a 
necessary restructuring, in exchange for an obligation for 
the debtor to negotiate with its creditors in good faith and to 
put in place policies that would prevent a similar problem 
from arising in the future. The mere knowledge that such a 
framework was in place should encourage debtors and credi-
tors to reach agreement of their own accord. Our model is 
one of a domestic bankruptcy court, but for a number of 
reasons it could not operate exactly like that. It is better to 
think of it as an international workout mechanism.225 
222 INTERNATIONAL MoNETARY FuND, ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 35, box 3.4 (2002). 
223 See KRuEGER, supra note 221, at 1-5. 
224 See MONTEK S. AHLUWALIA, THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK IN THE NEW FINANCIAL 
ARCHITECTURE, in INTERNATIONAL MoNETARY AND FINANCIAL ISSUES FOR THE 1990s (1999). 
225 Anne Krueger, International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Address at the National Economists' Club Annual Members' 
Dinner (Nov. 26, 2001), available at http:/ /www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/ 
11260l.HTM. However, the idea of a bankruptcy court for sovereign entities was not heard 
for the first time on that occasion. In the spring of 1997, the General Counsel of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Franc;:ois Gianviti, expressed his own personal view on the matter in a 
truly visionary way. As a remedy to the sovereign debt, he suggested the establishment of a 
bankruptcy court for sovereign debtors' external debt, which would determine what pay-
ments could be made to each creditor or category of creditors, probably with some resched-
uling or even partial debt forgiveness. See Franc;:ois Gianviti, The IMF and the Liberalization of 
Capital Markets, 19 Hous.]. INT'L L. 773, 773-83 ( 1997). 
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2. Envisaged Legal Framework 
What is envisaged is a legal framework that would allow a 
qualified majority of the sovereign's creditors to approve a restructur-
ing agreement, which would be then binding on a dissenting minor-
ity. Its other features will be: 
(a) a temporary stay on creditor litigation after a suspension of pay-
ment, but before a restructuring agreement is reached; 
(b) safeguards to protect creditors' interests during the stay; and 
(c) a mechanism to include new financing by giving it seniority over 
pre-existing private indebtedness during the period of stay.226 
It is also envisaged that an independent judicial panel would be cre-
ated to arbitrate disputes and oversee the process. An amendment to 
the IMF's Articles of Agreement would provide the legal basis to make 
a restructuring agreement binding on all creditors.227 
3. Difference of Opinion 
There is difference of opinion on the merits of the proposal. 
Some describe it as the most favorable solution in a matter where few, 
if any, dare to offer viable solutions, while others view it with skepti-
cism. Developing countries expect that a new multilateral agreement 
will be reached in the matter, based on the rule of law and recogniz-
ing political and economical interdependence between the members 
of the international community. They also expect that a more proac-
tive role will be played by the international financial institutions. Of 
course, the establishment of any supranational institution will involve 
the difficult task of overcoming perceived threats to national sover-
eignty, as national financial and economic policies are perceived to be 
a part of the exercise of a state's sovereignty.22B 
226 KRuEGER, supra note 221, at 10-11. 
227 I d. at 35. 
228 The new model envisages that the process will mainly be a legal one, but its imple-
mentation and overall recognition will undoubtedly be the result of a political compromise 
and involve a lot of international diplomacy and political consensus. At the same time, as 
all the literature on globalization unanimously argues, the concept of sovereignty has been 
reshaped in practice if not in theory in the contemporary world. The states should ac-
knowledge (or could only accept) the "new definitions" of the old terms. IT a new court of 
bankruptcy for sovereign entities is an anathema to the classical concept of "sovereignty" 
usually proclaimed rather vociferously by developing countries, then these countries 
should now recognize that the concept has changed in many other respects, and that the 
new approach is designed to offer a solution to the same states, while it might seem very 
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The proposal, as well as an interim contractual approach (envis-
aging the use of collective action clauses), is under active considera-
tion. The International Monetary and Financial Committee had its 
meeting on September 28, 2002, reviewed the progress on the pro-
posal, and encouraged the Fund to finalize it. 229 However, the IMF 
Committee of the Board of Governors of IMF has recently rejected 
the proposal (at least, for the time being). Although the Committee 
welcomed the work of the IMF in developing a concrete proposal for 
a statutory SDRM and expres&ed appreciation for the efforts of the 
IMF management and staff, it also stated the following: 
[W]hile recognizing that it is not feasible now to move for-
ward to establish the SDRM, [the Committee] agrees that 
work should continue on issues raised in its development 
that are of general relevance to the orderly resolution of 
financial crises. These issues include inter-creditor equity 
considerations, enhancing transparency and disclosure, and 
aggregation issues.230 
IX. INNOVATIVE SouRcEs oF FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT 
A. A Need for Innovation in Financing Development 
1. Raising Funds Without Imposing Heavy Burdens 
Given the recent declining trends in ODA flows and difficulties 
expected to be encountered in achieving a substantial and sustained 
increase, innovative sources of financing and development should be 
considered that would raise substantial funds without imposing heavy 
burden on taxpayers in donor countries. Moreover, in developing 
countries, while there has not been much innovation in mobilizing 
domestic resources, demands on public resources are increasing. Fi-
nancing the provision of global public goods has further highlighted 
the importance of finding additional and innovative means of 
unattractive to their creditors. However, in the doctrine it has been opined that no country 
is likely to go down this path unless absolutely has to. See generally KRUEGER, supra note 221. 
229 See generally Communique of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the 
Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund, International Monetary Fund (Sept. 
28, 2002). 
230 Communique of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Gover-
nors of the International Monetary Fund, International Monetary Fund, para. 15 (Apr. 12, 
2003), available at http:/ /www.imf.org/ external/np/ cm/2003/041203.htm. 
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financing. 231 Several proposals have been formulated to generate ad-
ditional financing at national and international levels. 
2. National Taxes Under International Agreements 
There are many possible national taxes flowing from interna-
tional agreements that could be or already are enforceable and that, if 
negotiated and accepted by the countries concerned, would result in 
substantial accretion to resource stream. These are to be collected by 
the national governments, and no international legislative body or 
collecting agency will be required. Three such taxes are: international 
air transport tax, carbon tax, and currency transaction tax. 
Other forms of taxation, requiring international agreement in 
some cases, that are recommended by experts are: taxation of the 
global commons through mining of the seabed232 or in Antarctica,233 
use of the outer space,234 taxation of ocean fishing,235 general levies 
on natural resource extraction and land,236 taxation of arms ex-
ports,237 a "bit tax,"238 taxation of public/civil society/private partner-
251 See Review of the Inputs to the Substantive Preparatory Process and the International Confer-
ence on Financing for Development, Note by the Secretary-General, Preparatory Committee for the 
International Conference on Financing for Development, 3d Sess., Agenda Item 2, pt. 2, 
U.N. Doc. A/ AC.257 /xx (2002), available at http:/ /www.un.org/ esa/ffd/aac257 _27a3.pdf. 
252 There is no seabed mining at present and there is a provision to tax this activity un-
der the Law of the Sea Convention. 
255 Mining in Antarctica is prohibited at present. 
254 The satellite use of the outer space would not, however, generate substantial reve-
nue. 
2!!5 This is unlikely to generate substantial revenue. 
256 The difficulty would arise because these are generally regarded as national matters, 
which makes them a normal source of domestic revenue. 
257 Governments must agree on "taxing themselves," meaning that since governments 
usually tax their citizens and not themselves, with these many innovative forms of taxation, 
governments will need to be willing to pay taxes themselves on oil, minerals, and pollution 
when it is not caused by a private company. As regards taxing imports or exports of arms, 
illegal transactions should be left untaxed. If taxed, such transactions would probably yield 
a considerable amount of money, but to do so would be both immoral and impracticable. 
Furthermore, it has been said that such a tax would contribute to increasing the illegal 
transfer of arms, having the opposite effect than the one desired. 
258 See RAGHBENDRA jHA, INNOVATIVE SoURCES OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: GLOBAL 
CooPERATION IN THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 13 (United Nations Univ., World Inst. for 
Dev. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2002/98, 2002) ("The base of th[e] [e-
mail/Internet taxes (the bit tax)] is the amount of data being sent through the Internet. 
According to one proposal, a person sending 100 emails per day with a 10-kilobyte docu-
ment would pay a tax of just one cent."). Experts have calculated that, for example, Inter-
net data traffic would have generated US$70 billion in 1996. /d. With the rapid expansion 
of the Internet, imposing such a tax would be very difficult from a technical point of view. 
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ships,239 a general tax on international trade, a tax on selected inter-
nationally traded commodities (for example, oil and minerals), and a 
tax on polluters for damage caused to the environment.240 
X. SYSTEMIC ISSUES 
In order to complement national development efforts, we recognize the ur-
gent need to enhance the coherence, governance, and consistency of the in-
ternational monetary, financial and trading systems.24l 
-The Monterrey Consensus Document 
A. Cohere:nce, Governance, and Consistency 
1. Better Response from International Partners 
In this interdependent world of ours, it is axiomatic that national 
development efforts cannot really achieve the goal of poverty eradica-
tion without a supportive and mutually reinforcing set of policies on 
the part of developed countries, regional development agencies, and 
international financial institutions. The Monterrey Consensus, in this 
regard, emphasized the need for enhancing coherence, improving 
governance, and increasing consistency of international monetary, 
financial, and trading architectures and processes. It underlined the 
importance of continuing to improve global governance and to 
strengthen the U.N.'s leadership role in promoting development.242 It 
encouraged policy and program coordination of international institu-
tions as well as coherence at the operational and institutionallevels.243 
It noted with satisfaction that efforts were being made to reform the 
international financial architecture and demanded that progress be 
sustained with greater transparency and greater participation of the 
developing countries. 244 
239 The difficulty related to this form of taxation comes from the fact that these are na-
tional arrangements that do not require international agreements for effective operation 
and that have been in operation for centuries, which makes them hardly innovative. 
240 See Tony Atkinson, Innovative Sources for Development Finance: Global Public 
Economics, Speech Given at the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics in 
Europe (May 16, 2003) (discussing the possibility of taxing, for example, short-term capital 
and currency flows ('Tobin tax") and global environmental taxes (carbon-use tax or air 
transport tax)). 
241 MoNTERREY CoNSENSUS, supra note 1, para. 52, at 12. 
242 Millennium Declaration, supra note 6, para. 6. 
243 /d. para. 30. 
244 Id. para. 13. 
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2. Specific Improvements Sought 
The Monterrey Consensus also called for coordination of macro-
economic policies among the leading industrial countries for achiev-
ing and sustaining global stability; prioritizing the identification and 
prevention of potential crises by multilateral financial institutions, 
particularly by the IMF; making them work on the basis of sound, na-
tionally owned reform programs; giving due consideration to the so-
cial costs of adjustment programs; and taking decisive action to mini-
mize their negative impact on the vulnerable segments of society.245 
The Consensus Document encouraged the IMF and World Bank to 
continue to enhance participation of all developing countries (and all 
countries with economies in transition) in their decision-making.246 In 
sum, the emphasis of the Monterrey Conference was on broadening 
and strengthening the role of developing countries in international 
economic decision-making and norm setting. It also recognized that a 
meaningful progress in multilateral forums would require capacity 
building of developing countries. The Consensus Document stated: 
"A first priority is to find pragmatic and innovative ways to further en-
hance the effective participation of developing countries and coun-
tries with economies in transition in international dialogues and deci-
sion-making processes. "247 
B. Prioritizing Efforts 
This is undoubtedly an ambitious agenda and, when substantially 
implemented, it will signifY great progress. However, it is a long-term 
process and will require sustained attention. It is thus appropriate to 
prioritize efforts. One area warranting early action, from the perspec-
tive of developing countries, is that of governance in Bretton Woods 
Institutions (BWis)-i.e., IMF and the World Bank. Normally, things 
run smoothly on the executive boards of BWis, but developing coun-
tries find themselves powerless when critical issues arise that involve a 
difference ofviews between the poor and rich countries. This is due to 
voting power structure where the principle of one nation, one vote 
does not apply. Voting power is distributed according to share hold-
ings.248 Further, the formulas for determining the vote (quotas in the 
245 MoNTERREY CoNSENSUS, supra note 1, paras. 54-56, 59, at 13. 
246 Id. para. 62, at 14. 
247 Id. para 63, at 14. 
248 See World Bank Group, Voting Powers, at http:/ /web.worldbank.org/WB SITE/EX-
TERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/O,contentMDK:5000494 7-menuPK:271153-pagePK:34542-piPK: 
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Fund and shares in the Bank) have remained the same since their in-
ception. 249 
With the passage of time, these formulas have become less and 
less reflective of the importance of many countries in the world econ-
omy. As a consequence, some of the largest economies, even in global 
terms, such as Brazil and Mexico, have less voting power than rela-
tively small industrial economies such as Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Switzerland.250 Developing countries expect that the existing bias 
329829-theSitePK:29708,00.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2004) ("Like all corporate organiza-
tions, each of the agencies of the World Bank Group has shareholders; these are the member 
countries. Every shareholder is allocated a certain number of votes linked to the size of its 
shareholding. The votes include a specified number of membership votes (which is the same 
for all members) and additional votes based on the number of shares of the stock held. The 
number of votes of a member expressed as a percentage of the total number of votes held by 
all shareholders is the member's voting power."). 
Similarly, the Executive Board of the IMF conducts the IMF's day-to-day business. It is 
composed of twenty-four Directors (appointed or elected by member countries or by 
groups of countries) and the Managing Director (its Chairman). The quota shares owned 
by a country determines the number of votes it may cast. For example, the United States 
owns 17.14% of the Fund and has 371,743 votes whereas Japan owns 6.15% of the Fund 
and has 133,378 votes. See International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Directors and Vot-
ing Power, at http:/ /www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm (last modified Apr. 
16, 2004). 
249 Transcript of an IMF Economic Forum, Do Developing Countries Have a Say at the 
IMF? (Feb. 5, 2004) (forum between Ariel Buira, Director of the G-24 Secretariat, Carol 
Welch, Director of International Programs, Friends of the Earth, & Thomas Dawson, Di-
rector of External Relations of the IMF), at http:/ /www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2004/ 
tr040205.htm ("The Bretton Woods formula is still in use, with variations in weights given 
to these variables. It's combined with four other formulas that use the same variables and 
give them somewhat different weights. There have been some changes. Instead of gross 
national income, now you use GDP, but very small adjustments."). 
250 Id. Initial discussion at Bretton Woods focused on "whether every state should have 
the same vote because of the legal principle of equality of states or ... whether power should 
be determined by contributions." Id. The decision was made that every state should be given 
250 basic votes and that each state would get an additional vote for each US$100,000 con-
tributed. Today, the number of basis votes allotted is "irrelevant ... [since] decisions are es-
sentially based on quotas." Id. In addition, though the Bretton Woods formula is still used, it 
is merged with other formulas, and discretion is also a factor. The use of discretion is appar-
ent, for example, when certain countries are compared to one another: 
Canada and China have exactly the same quota. The Chinese quota was in-
creased after the incorporation of Hong Kong to be exactly the same size as 
Canada's .... [Note, however, that] China is a much bigger economy than 
Canada. 
Now compare Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland, whose quotas are 
all bigger than Brazil's and Mexico's. But Brazil and Mexico are much bigger 
than the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland .... Another amazing ex-
ample: Belgium has a 74-percent bigger quota than Mexico, but Mexico's for-
eign trade alone is bigger than Belgium's GDP. 
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in formulas that leads to understating their economies be eliminated. 
It is pertinent to point out that: "as quotas have increased by some 36-
fold ... basic votes per member [have] remain[ed] unaltered since 
1944, [so that] the number of basic votes should be [in all fairness] 
substantially increased. "251 
Developing countries have also been reiterating their call "for a 
general allocation of SDRs, which would help alleviate pressures from 
the tightening of developing countries' access to private capital mar-
kets and assist the recovery of the world economy. "252 In addition, de-
veloping countries "urge those countries that have not done so to rat-
ify promptly the equity SDR allocation under the Fourth Amendment 
of the IMF's Articles of Agreement. "253 These measures will help de-
veloping countries in attaining MDGs. 
CoNCLUSION 
A. A Qp,alitatively Different Conference and Document 
The Monterrey Conference was qualitatively different from the 
other United Nations conferences. It was characterized by the inclu-
sion of all the stakeholders-particularly BV\lls. The preparations 
leading to the Conference and its proceedings were marked by a very 
high degree of professionalism and constructive interaction between 
developed and developing countries. It was free from polemics and 
the usual acrimony between the rich and poor nations. Ideological 
baggage was left behind and a new spirit of cooperation and accom-
modation prevailed. 
The Consensus Document is also profoundly different from 
other landmark U.N. documents, such as the Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Eco-
nomic Order (NIE0)254 and the Charter of Economic Rights and Du-
ties of States.255 Both developing and developed countries have trav-
Id. This formula also gives Denmark a bigger quota than Korea despite Korea's status as 
larger, more important economy. The most prominent comparison shows that the Euro-
pean quotas are larger than those in Asia, even though Asia's purchasing power parity is 
21.5% and Europe weighs in at below 3%. Id. 
251 Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four, supra note 217, para. 17, at 6. 
252 !d. para. 17 at 6. 
253 /d. 
254 See Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, U.N. 
GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No.1, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/Res/3202(S-VI) (1974). 
255 See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 
31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/Res/3281 (XXIX) (1974). 
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eled a long way since the era ofNIEO. Developing countries, owing to 
a variety of reasons, have become more realistic, responsible, and ma-
ture.256 Developed countries--having witnessed the tragic events of 
September 11th and become cognizant of indivisibility of develop-
ment and security, as well as having become aware of public opinion 
in their countries clearly favoring visible poverty reduction in the 
world-have exhibited a new spirit of accommodation. All this has 
been manifested in the Monterrey Consensus. As a consequence, a 
new partnership between developing and developed countries came 
into existence. This partnership is anchored on mutual responsibility 
and accountability to achieve measurable improvements in areas that 
are overwhelmingly critical for the good of mankind. 
What is required now and critically important is faithful imple-
mentation and sustaining of the Monterrey spirit. Implementation of 
the multifaceted agenda set forth in the Monterrey Consensus would 
require a holistic response involving a broad range of strategies, pro-
grams, and disciplines and a multitude of actors. 
B. Rnle of IEL: Going Beyond Instrumentality and Pace 
International economic law has a definite and significant role to 
play in the process. For one, IEL is indispensable if an edifice is to be 
constructed for enforcing mutual accountability between developing 
and developed countries. The very concept of accountability in the ul-
timate analysis is juridical and only makes sense if a legal mechanism is 
in place to ensure that the idea becomes operational. Further, there 
can be no difference of opinion about the role of IEL as an indispensa-
ble instrument to implement the Monterrey Consensus. It is necessary 
for accelerating the pace of momentum to achieve objectives indicated 
in Part I of this Article. However, the important point that needs to be 
recognized is that its role is not merely instrumental. The full role of 
IEL means going beyond the challenge of "pace" to that of breaking 
the path. It is not merely the letter, but the spirit of IEL-inspired by 
the right to development and the moral drive to bridge the gulf be-
tween affluence and hunger, ignorance, disease and despair-that 
would help in translating the vision of Monterrey into a reality. 
256 See Andres Velasco, Dependency Theory, FoREIGN PoL'Y, Oct.-Nov. 2002, at 44-45. 
Velasco argues that this has happened due to a variety of factors; for example, with the 
passage of time, anti-globalization sentiments weakened. Dependency doctrines and theo-
ries (both in radical and milder versions) were not proved valid in real life. Successors to 
first generation leaders in the Third World also became more pragmatic. Above all, the 
Third World discovered the futility of taking on industrial countries. 
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An attempt has been made below to depict relationships and in-
teractions between the Monterrey Consensus and IEL in the form of a 
matrix, which readers may hopefully find of some use. This interac-
tion between the desirable outcomes agreed upon by the interna-
tional community and the capability of the international law is essen-
tially one of demand and supply. In the context of this Article, the 
Monterrey Consensus represents demand and IEL represents supply. 
However, the process is more complex. It also involves mutual impact 
and enrichment. While the Monterrey Consensus has found an effec-
tive instrument, IEL has found a vital mission and a new meaning. 
Out of the interaction and synergy between the Consensus Document 
and IEL, much good is expected. 
MoNTERREY CoNsENsus AND INTERNATioNAL EcoNoMic LAw MA'IR1X 
lssUFS I AcnoNs MoNTERREY CoNsENsus iNTERNA'I10NAL ECONOMIC LAW D'YNAM!cs OF INTERAcnoN AND REIN-
FORCEMENT 
CoRE CoNCEP- Accepting the concept of a new Prompting the cooperative Opportunities provided by international 
TUALissUFS kind of partnership between de- law of nations-which binds consensus, as well as by pragmatic and 
veloped and developing countries states to adhere to principles of moral forces, should be exploited; 
anchored on mutual responsibil- cooperation for common inter- IEL will immensely gain as a discipline 
ity and accountability; ests-to play a proactive role because it will have a worthwhile mission to 
Sharing mutual responsibility: and realize its potential; perform-with direct impact on welfare of 
achievement of measurable im- Providing a legal mechanism mankind, enriching its contents and im-
provements in sustainable growth to enforce accountability of proving its utility-and will thus command 
and poverty reduction. both rich and poor nations; greater loyalty of a larger number of na-
Giving a concrete expression tions. 
to the well-recognized, mutual 
duty to cooperate in economic 
development. 
CoRE LEADING Ensuring proper follow-up to Facilitating transformation of The role to be played by IEL would not 
AcriONS implementing the agreements commitments into operational be merely instrumental--concerned with 
and commitments reached at the norms and informing decision- the pace of implementation alone-but it 
Monterrey Conference. making processes. would also influence and inspire the process 
with its concept of a world community and 
collective responsibilities. IEL should move 
beyond accelerating the "pace" to a point of 
"breaking the path" itself. 
FoREIGN DIREcr Increasing the volume and geo- Facilitating provision of risk The response of IEL to the challenge of 
INvFsTMENT I graphical coverage ofFDI and guarantees at subsidized cost, ensuring greater private capital flows and 
OTHER PRivATE other private flows to developing more easily obtainable and their wide dispersal among developing 
FLows countries. more reasonably priced; countries will hopefully result in universaliz-
Devising innovative legal struc- ing a liberal investment regime in the same 
tures and processes for more manner that GATT /WTO has universalized 
efficient, simpler, and cheaper liberal trade policies. 
co-f"mancing for venture capital 
arrangements and other 
lending instruments between 
source countries and 
multilateral institutions; 
Helping developing countries 
to liberalize foreign investment 
regimes; 
Assisting in the evolution of a 
comprehensive, balanced, and 
fair multilateral investment 
treaty in accordance with 
principles of rule of law. 
INTERNATIONAL Reaffirming a commitment to Helping developing countries A multilateral trading system enshrined in 
l'RAoE trade liberalization and a rule- to gain and consolidate better ac GATT/WTO has been erected on legal 
based, nondiscriminatory multi- cess to markets; foundations. The international community 
lateral trading system. Assisting developing countries 
looks to IEL to assist it further by way of 
additions and improvements to the existing 
in negotiations by providing a structure. 
set of standards based on the 
rule oflaw, inter alia, to prevent 
the misuse of legal processes. 
ODA: SUBSTAN- Increasing ODA substantially to Helping to adopt a new para- A synergy of spirit of Monterrey and that 
TIAL INCREASE enable developing countries to digm for ODA that seeks to of cooperative law of nations-based on 
INODA achieve internationally-agreed de- transform the charity of nations recognition of right to development, clear 
velopment goals; in to a binding obligation of the duty of states to cooperate to eradicate pov-
Ensuring that recipient and do- world community. erty, and factual acceptance of entitlement 
nor countries and international to assist based on need-can transform vol-
institutions make ODA more effec- untary charity of nations into an obligation 
tive, e.g., by harmonizing opera- of the world community embedded in in-
tional procedures, better donor ternationallaw. 
coordination, improving targeting 
to the poor, and enhancing recipi-
ents' ownership; 
Ensuring that developing coun-
tries act on their commitments to 
adopt sound policies, establish 
good institutions, fight corruption, 
and promote good governance. 
REsOLUTION OF Calling for further improvement Helping to further strengthen External or domestic debt, in the ultimate 
ExTERNAL DEBT in the enhanced HIPC initiative; legal structure of debt relief analysis, turns into a legal matter. Debt relief 
PROBLEM providing, inter alia, debt can- must thus take place through legal processes Pleading for additional resources 
for the HIPC Trust Fund; cellation mechanisms, debt and mechanisms. An effective solution may 
education, and debt health swap break the vicious circle when there is (a) will-
Stressing need to address instruments. ingness from creditors to recognize the futil-
external debt problems of non- ity of giving new loans so that borrowers may 
HIPC countries. use them to repay the old ones, and (b) a 
capability in the legal system for writing off 
such bad debts. Here, an interplay between 
the Monterrey Conference's keenness to find 
a solution to debt problems and the capacity 
ofiEL to supply innovative and creative solu-
tions would prove fruitful. 
ADOPTION OF Calling for developing an inter- Helping to establish a legal The model envisaged by the IMF for re-
ANINTERNA- national debt workout mechanism framework, allowing a qualified structuring unsustainable debt is very simi-
TIONALDEBT to restructure unsustainable debt majority of sovereign creditors lar to that of a domestic bankruptcy court. 
WoRKoUT in a timely and efficient manner; to approve a restructuring agree- The international financial community's 
MECHANISM 
Promoting fair burden sharing ment that would provide for a demand for a solution will be met by are-
and minimizing moral hazard. stay on creditors' litigation, safe- sponse from IEL through extrapolation of 
guards to protect creditors' inter domestic legal experience to the interna-
ests during the stay, a tiona! arena. 
mechanism to induce new fi-
nancing, and a judicial panel to 
arbitrate disputes and oversee 
the process. 
INNOVATIVE Exploring innovative sources of Setting up appropriate legal Introducing an innovative system offi-
SoURCES oF rmancing. mechanisms and processes to nancing will be a challenge for IEL and will 
FiNANCING make innovative rmancing pos- cross the operational divide between devel-
sible. opment thinking and practice. 
IMPROVING Strengthening the leadership of Giving effect to measures Here again, it is the mutually reinforcing 
GLOBAL the U.N. for development; aimed at improving global gov- process between development aspirations 
EcoNoMic 
Enhancing coherence, govern- ernance, for which IEL is in- and legal framework and spirit that makes a GoVERNANCE 
ance, and consistency of the inter- deed indispensable. powerful combination for effective im-
national system; provement. IEL would not only provide the 
necessary instruments, but it would also 
Improving international rmancial furnish models of good governance in vari-
architecture; ous spheres of life for adoption and emula-
Enhancing participation of devel- tion. 
oping countries in international 
dialogues, norm setting, and deci-
sion-making processes. 
